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Structure, conduct and performance are important elements
in the economic analysis of an industry. This thesis identi-
fies and discusses the sub-elements of structure, conduct
and performance of the U.S. shipbuilding and repair industry
and how these sub-elements interact. A brief history of the
industry to the Merchant Marine Act of 19 70 is presented.
Structure sub-elements are comprised of concentration, pro-
duction methods, labor, governmental influences, barriers to
entry, demand for U.S. Navy and merchant vessels and financ-
ing methods. Conduct sub-elements consist of public policies,
labor utilization, financing behavior, claims, competition,
research and development and conglomerate behavior. Perform-
ance sub-elements are identified as productivity, output,
profitability, claims impact, and government evaluation.
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The United States shipbuilding industry has had a long
history within which it played an important part in the
development of the nation. From the late 1700's, the
industry has experienced periods of peak demand where full
employment and large profit potential existed, to periods of
slack orders, low employment levels and the subsequent dis-
appearance of marginal performers. As line officers in the
U.S. Navy, the writers have a natural interest in the ship-
building industry of the United States and this interest has
been further stimulated by recent Navy problems in the area
of shipbuilding claims, cost escalation in shipbuilding
contracts and general criticisms of the U.S. Navy ship pro-
curement methods.
A. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
A review of past literature on the shipbuilding industry
revealed that although many studies had been conducted, none
could be identified as having specifically examined and
identified the elements of structure, conduct and performance
in the shipbuilding industry, a more common method of
industry analysis as indicated by Caves in 1972 [1, p. 15].
Thus, it was decided to pursue this method of approach.
The initial literature reviewed for this study included
the Seapower Subcommittee (Bennett) Hearings of 1970, the
report of the Commission on American Shipbuilding of 1973,
17

and Frankel and Marcus 1 book on Ocean Transportation .
Letters were also sent to eleven major U.S. shipbuilders
requesting information on their current capacity, orderbook,
financial data and a brief history of their shipyard(s). In
general, the responses were quite good and the addressees,
owners and replies are as indicated below:
Shipbuilder (Owner) Reply
Avondale (Ogden No
Bath (Bath Industries) Yes
Bethlehem Steel Yes
Electric Boat (General Dynamics) Yes
Ingalls (Litton) No
Lockheed Shipbuilding Negative Reply*
National Steel (Kaiser) Yes
Newport News (Tenneco) Yes
Quincy (General Dynamics) Yes
Sun (Sun Oil) Yes
Todd Shipyards Yes
*Reasons stated were proprietary nature of request and pend-
ing claims litigation.
Although desirable, we were unable to obtain financial
data on the shipbuilding divisions of the large diversified
companies due to their reluctance to provide such data and the
consolidation of all divisions in their annual reports.
The Maritime Administration (MarAd) was also helpful in
providing numerous MarAd documents in response to our order.
Finally, many other articles, hearings, texts and government
annual reports available locally were utilized, such as




Although not unexpected, problems were encountered in
this study which were of the nature listed below:
1. Data Variation
In many instances, pertinent data was not current or
available. Some reports grouped data by calendar years and
others by fiscal years. Annual reports by government agen-
cies had delays in publication of up to twelve months and
thus, there are tables in this study which could not be
reported past FY19 73.
2
.
Shipbuilding and Shipping Industries
The maritime industry includes both the shipbuilding
and shipping industries. It was noted that the relationships
between these two industries was very close. Maritime data
was difficult, but necessary, to separate especially with
regard to the Maritime Administration's (MarAd) role.
3 Ship Construction, Repair and Conversion
The shipbuilding industry is generally defined by
the Standard Industrial Code (SIC) 3731. This code includes
all products and services sold by privately owned establish-
ments which are primarily engaged in shipbuilding and ship
repair but. also includes conversion and alteration of ships.
It was noted that a breakdown of data into the areas of con-
struction, repair, conversion and alteration, would have been
too difficult to pursue. Therefore, "shipbuilding" in the
context of this study includes all the subordinate activities
mentioned above. When areas addressed refer to new ship con-
struction only, this point will be made in the text.

4. Boundaries
It was the original intent of this study to present
information for the period 1965-1974. However, due to the
variability of data previously mentioned, this was not pos-
sible and the writers have attempted to present the most
current data available and provide historical data at least
back to 1969. Unfortunately, as this study was concluded,
the 1974 Seapower Subcommittee hearings on the status of
shipyards were just being distributed. Additionally, per-
tinent annual reports were also being published but were not
available for inclusion in this study. It is suggested that
these documents would provide excellent sources for updating
the information contained herein by interested readers.
5. Limitations
This study has been limited to major shipyards
capable of constructing oceangoing vessels with lengths of
475 feet and beams of 6 8 feet. These dimensions coincide
with the dimensions used by the Commission on American Ship-
building in their 19 73 report in which they state that . . .
"the Maritime Administration considers shipways of this size
to have some value, including mobilization potential" [31, p. 23]
C. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS
This thesis first provides a brief history of the U.S.
shipbuilding industry. Each element of structure, conduct
and performance is then identified and discussed in the




II. HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY
A. EARLY HISTORY
The shipping and shipbuilding industries have played an
important part in the development of the United States.
During the early history, much of the country's finished
goods and industrial products were imported from Europe on
wooden sailing ships.
Maritime subsidies, in slightly different form, originated
in legislation passed by the First Congress of the United
States. In 1789, the Congress enacted the first tariff
stipulating a ten percent reduction in customs duties for
goods imported in American vessels. It further provided a
tonnage tax in favor of American shipping.
In 1845, Congress approved the government's first subsidy
when it authorized mail subsidies to steamships with prefer-
ence to those which could be converted into warships. The.
subsidies helped to establish shipping lanes to various
parts of the world until 1858 when they were discontinued
because they were considered an unnecessary drain on the
Treasury. By 1850, the United States had the second largest
merchant marine in the world, next to England. However,
American ships were considered the finest constructed.




B. CIVIL WAR UP TO WW I
It was the Civil War that proved to be the turning point
for the U.S. Merchant Marine. To avoid losing any further
ships, large numbers were transferred to foreign registry
with the restriction that those that were transferred would
not be permitted to return to U.S. registry.
It was also during the Civil War that steel-hull, steam-
propelled ships were first developed. Because the U.S. had
not yet acquired the technical expertise nor the productive
capability of European countries, American ships were con-
structed at a much higher cost. The high cost of U.S. ships
necessitated large expenditures for capital investment in
efforts to increase shipyard productivity. It was a combina-
tion of these high capital cost requirements coupled with
greater investment opportunities associated with the westward
expansion of the United States that made investment in Ameri-
can shipbuilding unattractive. This resulted in the U.S.
Merchant Marine declining from a once prominent position to
a level in 1914 where only nine percent of the value of
foreign commerce was carried on American ships [31, p. 18].
Despite Congress 1 concern to revitalize the merchant
fleet, no strong measures were enacted. Most congressional
interest in the maritime industry from 1912 through 1914
dealt primarily with antitrust and antimonopoly investigations,
C. WW I THROUGH 19 36
The outbreak of war in Europe in 1914 forced foreign
nations to withdraw their ships, leaving our ports overcrowded
22

with cargo with no means of transport. Thus, Congress was
forced to enact emergency legislation permitting foreign
built ships to be registered in the United States for use in
foreign trade.
In 1916/ Congress enacted the Shipping Act which included
(1) broad powers for acquiring ships through purchase, lease,
charter, or building (prohibiting the purchase or charter
from a country at war) , and for the operation of these ships
for commercial purposes; (2) authorization for liner or con-
ference agreements subject to the prohibition of unfair or
discriminatory practices and to the publication of rates;
and (3) general instructions for the sale or disposal of
vessels to U.S. citizens [31, p. 19].
A modification to the Shipping Act of 1918 "prohibited
the transfer of a U.S. ship to foreign registry or the sale
or lease of ships, shipyards , or drydock to a foreigner in
time of national emergency" [31, p. 19], It also prohibited
using U.S. shipyards for foreign construction.
Through the provisions of the Shipping Act, the United
States embarked on a large shipbuilding program which saw
the American merchant fleet grow from 6.8 percent of the
world's total (gross tons) in 1914 to 22.2 percent in 1920
[31, p. 19].
A problem arose at the end of the war in that the Shipping
Act failed to provide for the disposal of surplus government-
owned ships. To correct this problem, the Merchant Marine
Act of 19 20 was enacted which set as official policy of the
U.S. the establishment and maintenance of a merchant marine of

the best equipped and most suitable types of vessels
sufficient to carry the greater portion of its commerce
and serve as a naval or military auxiliary in time of
war or national emergency, ultimately to be owned and
operated privately by citizens of the United States. . .
[31, p. 19] .
Both the Act of 1916 and the Act of 1920 failed to affect
appreciably the disposal of ships to private citizens. This
motivated Congress to debate such issues as continued govern-
ment ownership and subsidies. The issues culminated in the
Merchant Marine Act of 192 8 which "permitted the continuation
of government ownership and operation" although the real
intent of the Act was designed "to encourage a privately
owned merchant marine" [31, p. 19].
The main features of the Act of 1928 were: (1) to restrict
the sale of vessels or lines of vessels to private interest;
(2) to authorize the improvement of existing vessels and to
recommend to Congress on the construction of new vessels;
(3) to increase the construction- loan fund features; (4) to
provide for mail-contract payments on a bid basis; (5) to
impose citizenship restrictions on the crews of vessels
carrying mail contracts; and (6) to require government
officials to travel on U.S. vessels when on official business.
The U.S. merchant fleet's share of the foreign trade con-
tinued to decline despite the efforts of Congress. By 1939,
it had fallen to about 22%, partly because new ship construc-
tion had fallen off again. Presidential and congressional
interest resulted in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936.
24

D. 1936 THROUGH 1946
In addition to terminating the ocean mail contracts, the
Act of 1936 established construction and operating differen-
tial subsidies, CDS and ODS respectively, for private opera-
tors on essential foreign trade routes.
Another important provision of the Act was the establish-
ment of a 500 ship construction program. The program was to
span a ten-year period, 50 ships per yeaDr. This program
proved to be of tremendous value to the U.S. effort, at the
outbreak of WW II in that it provided an impetus to the
required expansion of the shipbuilding industry. By 1946,
the U.S. had about 56 million dwt of ocean going merchant
vessels, 60% of the total world tonnage [31, p. 21].
The Ship Sales Act of 1946 provided for the sale, over a
limited period of time, of war-built vessels to citizens and
foreigners alike on a fixed price basis [31, p. 21]. This
Act permitted short-term charters (at high rates) to U.S.
citizens but the charter of war-built vessels to foreigners
was not permitted.
E. POST-WW II TO PRESENT
The shipbuilding industry experienced a drastic cutback
in production at the end of the war. The reduction in output
caused some shipyards to close. However, other companies
emerged that were later to become strong competitors (e.g.
Avondale Shipyards and National Steel and Shipbuilding Co.).
The United States merchant fleet began to decline in
numbers after WW II, primarily due to foreign purchases of
25

some 1,100 U.S. ships under the Merchant Ship Sales Act of
1946 and also due to revival of foreign shipbuilding and the
scrapping of WW II U.S. merchant vessels [8, p. 6]. As other
nations' fleets and shipbuilding industries became progres-
sively larger, more productive and more competitive, the U.S.
flag fleet continued to decline to the point where by 1969,
it carried only five percent of the nation's foreign trade as
compared to eleven percent in 1960 [47, p.l].
The ineffective attempts to halt this decline in the U.S.
maritime industry led to the enactment of the 19 70 ammendment
to the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. Basically, the 1970
ammendment called for a revitalization of the U.S. Merchant
Marine and shipbuilding industry by providing for a large
number of highly productive merchant ships of advanced
design to be constructed annually,- with federal assistance,
over a ten-year period. The capacity to add to the merchant
fleet each year was to be equal to that of 3 highly produc-
tive modern ships, in quantities to permit series production
and, when practicable, of standard design. In addition, the
1970 ammendment called for [43, pp. 1-2]:
(1) Multi-year procurement contracts.
(2) Extending provisions for construction subsidies to
ships engaged in all U.S. foreign trade, including those
engaged in dry and liquid bulk trade which were
previously unqualified.
(3) Extending operating differential subsidies (ODS) to
U.S. bulk carriers engaged in foreign trade.
26

(4) Authorizing a ceiling of $3 billion vice $1 billion
Federal ship construction and mortgage loan guarantees.
However/ this ceiling has since been increased to $5
billion.
(5) Broadening the scope of Construction Reserve Funds.
(6) Expanding and re-orienting priorities of the Maritime
Administration's R&D programs.
Many of the detailed aspects of the 1970 ammendment will
be discussed later in this study. However, the new program
was expected to have a major impact by stimulating the desire
for construction of new vessels in U.S. shipyards.
27

III. STRUCTURE OF THE U.S. SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY
A. INTRODUCTION
For the scope of this study, structure of the U.S. ship-
building industry refers to the economically significant
features of the U.S. Navy and merchant ship market which
affects the behavior of the U.S. shipbuilding industry which
supplies the market. As will be observed throughout this
chapter, the U.S. shipbuilding industry's structure is a
complex interaction of government and private enterprise
with inherently unstable demand. Due to the high costs of
labor and material in the United States, the government
plays a dominant role in the industry through subsidies,
Navy shipbuilding and repair contracts, and public policies.
Approximately 90% of the U.S. shipyard industry output since
World War II has been attributed to the government either
through subsidies for merchant ship construction or Naval
vessel construction or conversion [9, p. 81].
The United States commercial shipbuilding industry is
not a major competitor in the world market. During the
period 1967-1971, the United States produced only 1.55% of
the tonnage (dwt) and 1.63% of the ships constructed through-
out the world [32, p. 46]. Almost the entire output of U.S.
shipyards is for domestic customers. For example, in 1971
only 2% of the industry's output (482,329 grt) were for
export [32, p. 85]. In 1972, shipbuilding accounted for only
28

0.3% of the gross national product, ranking roughly 40th of
all U.S. industries in gross sales [32, p. 85].
1. Major U.S. Shipyards
The shipbuilding industry in the U.S. today is
operating at a much lower level than it did during WW II.
During that war, there were 57 private shipyards that were
capable of constructing ocean-going ships, while today there
are only about 25. However, of these 25 only ten to sixteen
have been actively engaged in new construction while the
remainder have limited their activities to ship repair.
The U.S. shipbuilding industry has been estimated by
both the Department of Commerce (1971) and by officials
appearing before the 19 70 Seapower Subcommittee (Bennett
Hearings) to have been operating at approximately 60% of its
current capacity. However, the exact meaning of the term
capacity has not always been clearly understood. Capacity,
as related to shipbuilding, is generally meant to be a
measure of a shipyard's physical assets, such as unused ways
or maximum possible employment or equipment or machinery
[36, p. 9988, 10690-91]. The meaning of capacity as it has
just been described relates primarily to input assets that
are available for utilization. The output implications of
capacity will be described in greater detail in Chapter V
dealing with the performance of shipyards.
On the other hand, capability is comprised of human
and economic factors that eventually determine the potential
use of this capacity. For example, the capability to perform
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specific shipyard tasks (e.g. ship alteration) is primarily
determined by the mix of skills (e.g. welders, electricians,
supervisors) and equipment and machinery employed.
Particular data pertaining to major private and
naval shipyards used as sources of information for this study
are listed in Appendix A.
B. CONCENTRATION OF THE U.S. SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY TODAY.
Shipbuilding is an international industry attempting to
sell ships to the world's ocean transportation industry. It
is a complex industry interwoven with multi-national firms
and various forms and types of government protection and
subsidies. It sells in a market made uncertain primarily by
the unpredictability of the demand for ships. One nation's
shipbuilding industry can be its most important commercial
enterprise as measured by its contribution to the nation's
total GNP , while in others it is commercially insignificant,
and/or existing only under heavy government support.
While shipbuilding in general is strongly related to
international shipping, the commercial market for the U.S.
shipbuilding industry is generally limited to U.S. coastal
shipping operators taking advantage of the protective features
of the Jones Act, and those shipping companies that wish to
take advantage of government subsidizations (i.e. CDS and
ODS) . One recent study concluded that in 1971 naval vessel
construction and repair accounted for 59% of the industry's
sales while naval construction represented approximately 67%
of the country's new construction [16, p. J 5].
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1 . Major Private U.S. Shipyards-
The information presented in this report is based on
data obtained from various sources (e.g. published reports,
studies, material received directly from most of the contrac-
tors) on the ten major private shipyards listed in Table 1.
All the firms listed, with the exception of Todd, are sub-
sidiaries of larger corporations. Because of this, sales
and profitability information of U.S. yards is difficult to
document since individual, unconsolidated financial records
are unobtainable.
TABLE 1
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Ingall's Nuclear S.B. Div,
Litton Ship Systems Div.
Seattle






2 . Market Distribution
A record number of shipbuilding orders under the
Maritime Administration's construction differential subsidy
(CDS) program were placed during fiscal 1973 (fiscal year
data is usually available in April of the following calendar
year). Contracts valued at almost $1.3 billion were awarded
during the year for the construction of seventeen new ships
and the conversion of three freighters into productive con-
tainerships (Table 2) [50, p. 6-7]. It is interesting to
note that these contracts constitute the largest investment
in commercial U.S. ship construction made in any peacetime
year. Factors which may account for this large number of
orders include the decision to proceed with the construction
of the Alaskan oil pipeline, an active interest on the part
of Congress and Mar/\d to work towards achieving the stated
goals of the 1970 Act, and an increased demand for crude oil
carriers. Also noteworthy is that the nine I.NG ' s under con-
tract will be the first ships of this type to be constructed
in the U.S. They will also carry the lowest CDS rates since
the subsidized shipbuilding program was initiated in 1936
[50, p.l]. The low CDS rates may be attributed to the techno-
logical advantage of the U.S. in these high technology
vessels. This advantage is reflected in lower unit-cost
differentials between U.S. and foreign shipyards for the
construction of LNG type vessels.
Ten new subsidized merchant ships were completed
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MERCHANT DELIVERIES FROM U.S. SHIPYARDS DURING FY1973
Shipbuilder Type of Ship No. of Ships
(subsidized)
Bath containership 2
GD (Quincy) seabee 2
Litton (Ingalls) containership 5
Avondale lash 1
Todd (various) 12*
Triple "A" containership 3*
TOTAL (subsidized) 25
*Conversions
Source: Maritime Administration, 1973 Annual Report, p. 9.
The next table summarizes shipbuilding activity in
private yards for both merchant and naval vessels during
calendar years 1970 to 1973.
Table 5 is an overview of large merchant ships under
construction or on order as of the dates listed and according
to type of ship.
Table 6 summarizes, by type, number of ships and
total displacement, naval ships under construction or on
order in private yards as of January 1, 1974.
In summary, naval construction represented approxi-
mately 67% of the nation's new construction in 1971, while
naval construction and repair accounted for 59% of the indus-
try's sales. Because of the conglomeration of the industry,
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NAVAL VESSELS UNDER CONSTRUCTION OR ON ORDER
IN PRIVATE SHIPYARDS AS OF JANUARY 1, 1974
NO. OF TOTAL LIGHT
TYPE VESSELS DISl'.TONS
Replenishment Oiler (AOR) 1 12,500
Attack Aircraft Carrier (Nuclear) (CVAN) 2 142,000
Destroyer (DD) 16 80,000
Escort Ship (DE) 3 7,872
Guided Missile Frigate (Nuclear) (DLGN) 5 40,110
Amphibious Assault Ship (Special) (LHA) 5 115,000
Patrol Frigate (PF) 1 2,727
Attack Submarine (Nuclear) (SSN) 23 125,555
Totals 56 525,764
Source: Shipbuilders Council of America [23, p. 33]
A record number of shipbuilding orders under the CDS program
were placed in FY197 3. Nine of the vessels were LNG's which
carried the lowest CDS rates since 19 3 6 when the maritime
subsidy program was initiated. This is probably due to the
U.S. advantage over foreign shipyards in cryogenic technology
3 . Labor Force
Total industry employment at private U.S. shipyards
continued at a fairly constant rate during the period 1966-
1969 (see Table 7). During the two-year period, 1970-1971,
total employment dropped substantially with the exception of
the Gulf Coast area where employment has continued to rise
since 1967. The large rise in industry employment through
the end of the third quarter 19 74 can be accounted for, in
part, by a revision in the benchmark used for reporting
purposes by the Bureau of Labor Statistics [25, p.lj. The




PRIVATE SHIPYARD EMPLOYMENT - ALL EMPLOYEES
(Yearly Average in Thousands)
Y . , North South Great Lakes
Atlantic Atlantic Gulf Pacific and Inland
1966 143.6 52.6 24.8 35.6 20.7 9.9
1967 140.0 48.4 26.1 34.8 20.7 10.0
1968 141. C 46.2 27.0 36. 5 22.4 8.9
1969 142.0 45. 8 26.0 37.6 25.2 7.4
1970 132.4 43. 8 23.2 38.8 20.2 7.9
1971 130.6 40.4 23.3 4 3.2 16.4 7.3
1972 148.1 39.3 28.9 46.6 15.7 7.6
1973 144.4 40.2 29.8 4 8.6 17.5 8.4
1974* 156.4 45.7 27. 8 50.0 24.5 8,4
^Through the end of the third quarter.
Source: Ernst G. Frankel and Henry S. Marcus, Ocean Trans-
portation , 1973, p. 398.
Statistical Quarter ly, Third Quarter - 197 4..
Shipbuilders Council of America.
base has been expanded. Expansion is derived from the new
definition of employer - one or more rather than four or more
employees
.
Employment at the naval shipyards (see Table 8) over
the last several years has changed much more than the level
at private yards. Total employment in naval shipyards has
steadily declined during the last seven years.
Table 9 compares the average hourly earnings of




NAVAL SHIPYARD EMPLOYMENT - ALL EMPLOYEES
(Yearly Average in Thousands)
„ , ,-.-, Puget SoundBoston (1) ., , ,, 2, • /on
,. m . n _, . f. Norfolk San Francisco (2)Year Total Portsmouth _, » n^ • n ^ i i-
•
Charleston Los AngelesPhiladelphia








*Through the end of the third quarter.
(1) Boston closed July 1, 1974
(2) Hunter's Point closed June 29, 1974
Source: Statistical Quarterly, Third Quarter - 1974,
Shipbuilders Council of America [25, p. 2].
by geographical regions of the country. The Gulf Coast area
consistently had the lov/est average hourly earnings for the
three-year period. Based on the Gulf Coast's three-year
average hourly earning rate of $4.05, the North Atlantic
three year average rate was 9.4 percent higher, the South












AVERAGE HOURLY EARNINGS OF PRODUCTION WORKERS IN THE






1971 $4.13 $4.19 $4.26 $3.82 $4.70 $3.97
1972 4.35 4.36 4.47 4.05 5.13 4.25
19 73 4.60 4.73 4.65 4.27 5.3 2 4.55
3 Year $4.36 $4.43 $4.46 $4.05 $5.05 $4.26
Average
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Maritime Administra-
tion: Relative Cost of Shipbuilding , June 19 74,
p. 26
.
The information compiled in the following tabic lists
the major shipyards and their total employees as of the dates
indicated. The employees are then separated into general
functional groupings by numbers and percentage of total
employees, within the company. Detailed employee data was
not available for General Dynamics (Groton-E.E. ) . In three
cases, data was recorded for two successive periods to illus-
trate significant changes that had occurred within that par-
ticular company.
4. Discussion
There are approximately 40 companies engaged in the
shipbuilding and repair industry [32, p. 137]. Of these, the
four largest contractors account for over two-fifths of all
sales, while the eight largest firms account for three-fifths
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which these figures are based is unknown, however the COAS
obtained their information for this analysis from the 19 72
edition of the Million Dollar Directory . The U.S. ship-
building industry is considerably less concentrated than the
aircraft industry where 70% of the total business is accounted
for by the four largest producers [32, p. 137].
C. PRODUCTION METHODS
The basic methods for the production of vessels in U.S.
shipyards are, with few exceptions, the same conventional
methods that have been used in the past. However, in the
last few years, most of the major yards have responded to
the increased demand for ships by expending large sums of
money for expanding and modernizing their facilities. They
have also adopted new production techniques in expectation
of decreasing costs and increasing productivity.
Production processes, construction costs and periods, and
recent advancements in shipyard technology will be discussed
in this section.
1 . P roduction Processes
The following is a brief outline of the procedures a
conventional shipyard would follow in the production of a
merchant ship [2, p. 57]:
a. Preparation of schedules, working drawings,
templates, and other information for all work to be done.
b. Receipt, storage and advance preparation of




c. Fabrication: layout and cutting of plates and
shapes to desired size and contour (by manual or automatic
flame burning); forming or shaping plates, if required.
d. Fitting together and welding of subassemblies or
"blocks," consisting of stiffened plate panels or irregular
box-shaped components.
e. Erection and welding in place of subassemblies
on the building berth.
f. Launching.
g. Installation of machinery and outfit, either at
step (d) or later.
The next production process will describe the
assembly line method of ship construction used by the Ingalls
Shipbuilding Division (Litton) in Pascagouia, Mississippi.
This is the process that is being used to produce the DD-96 3
class destroyers. The company once claimed that this produc-
tion method would require 30% fewer man hours than would a
conventional yard [32, p. 9 8].
To visualize the continuous single-flow concept, the
reader is asked to view Figure 1 in conjunction with the
following description: steel is brought to the Material
Receiving Area (1) by barge, rail or truck and off-loaded
into the Material Storage Area (2). The fabrication complex
(3), comprised of the Fabrication Shop, Panel Assembly Shop
and Shell Assembly Shop, is the first major production area
of the facility. From here steel which has been fabricated





^~] Procasssd end Packaged Material
Ausmbliei. Suteuemblies and Module*
Figure 1. Diagram Model of Ingalls New Shipyard.
A A

the Staging Areas (4) to the Subassembly Areas (5) where
they are physically combined with non-structural outfitting
kits flowing from the manufacturing shops and warehouse (B)
to form subassemblies. These subassemblies, weighing up to
200 tons, move to the Modular Assembly Areas (6), joined
together and outfitted to form a complete section or module
of the ship. The modules are moved to the Ship Integration
Area (7) and mated to form the complete ship. Form here the
ship is translated to the launch position (8) for side
launch. Following launch the ship is towed to the post
launch Outfitting Docks (9) for test, dock trials and final
outfitting preparatory to delivery [2, pp. 111-112].
Modular construction techniques are coming into
wider usage by several of the major yards (e.g. Avondale,
Litton, Quincy, Todd and Bethlehem) seeking to realize cost
reduction benefits.
2 • Construction Costs
The major components of unit construction costs are
labor, material and overhead. Material costs, generally, are
more predictable than labor costs which are significantly
influenced by the productivity of the labor force, which, in
turn, is susceptible to greater fluctuations for a variety
of reasons (e.g. an impending reduction in the labor force,
morale problems). Of the three, the least certain variable
is the cost of overhead. Labor and overhead account for
approximately 40-50% of U.S. total shipbuilding costs, the
remaining 50-60% being accounted for by material costs and




The basic unit construction . cost is the total of
charges for hull, outfit, and machinery material plus asso-
ciated labor, overhead and engineering costs. To this unit
cost is then added profit, and possibly an allowance for
escalation factors, to arrive at the selling price.
The total price of a ship depends to a great extent
on the type and size of ship being purchased. For example,
a 63,000 dwt LNG costs from $90 - $106 million whereas
tankers in a range of 35,000 - 265,000 dwt cost from $20 -
$81.5 million [50, p. 73]. Items that will cause the total
price to vary include National Defense Features and safety
features requirements built into the ship, as well as geo-
graphical cost differentials. For example, based on a
representative 89,000 dwt tanker with a cost of $30 million,
it was determined that, in 1973, it would cost 4.2% ($1.27
million) more to construct this vessel in a West Coast ship-
yard than it. would in a yard on the East Coast. The same
vessel could be obtained on the Gulf Coast for 3.3% ($0,98
million) less than on the East Coast [51, p. 29]. It is
interesting to note that West Coast shipyards, which MarAd
found (1974) to be the most costly, have nonetheless
managed to obtain a large share of commercial work in the
past year. For example, West Coast shipyards had under
contract as of January 1, 1974, a total of 33 merchant ships
out of a total of 88.
Relationships among cost factors vary with circum-





RELATIVE COSTS OF MATERIAL AND LABOR BY TYPE OF VESSFL
Steel harbor tugs (1) 68% 32%
Typical wood fishing vessels (1) 67 33
Typical general cargo ships (2) 4 8 52
A naval auxiliary ship (1) 59 41
A naval combatant ship (1) 55 45












A naval submarine (1) 6 2
A naval hydrofoil craft (1) 65
265,000 dwt tanker (2) 5:
87,000 dwt tanker (2) 47
Ro/Ro (2) 4 8
LASH and container (2) 49
LNG (spherical) (2)
(1) Joseph A. Fetchko, Methods of Estimating Investment Costs
of Ships, The University of Michigan,- June 1968, p. 21.
(2) D. M. Mack-Forlist , Report to the Commission on American
Shipbuilding on a Forecast of the Levels of Construction Dif-
ferential Subsidy in 19 76, March 19 73, p.69<
Source: Commission on American Shipbuilding [31, p. 106]
.
3 . Construction Period
The amount of time that it takes to construct a ship
depends on several factors such as the type and size of ship,
productivity of the shipyard, and the availability of
material, supplies and labor.
Information obtained from the Navy indicated that it
takes approximately 16-26 months between keel laying and
builder's trials to construct a Spruance-class (DD-9 63)
destroyer, and about 27-42 months between keel laying and
4 7

builder's trials to build a helicopter assault (LHA) ship.
The lower of the two figures in both cases listed above
was based on the expected construction period for the last
ship in that series (e.g. 30th destroyer and 5th LHA). The
higher figure represented the expected construction period
for the first ships in the series.
Data received from a private West Coast shipyard
indicated that it generally takes about 7-8 months after the
keel is laid before the ship (tanker) is launched and
another 5-8 months before it is delivered. The greatest
variation was observed in the period between contract award
and keel laying which varied between 11-26 months.
The construction period for tankers constructed in
this particular yard varied between 27-38 months. However,
the writers would like to caution that this information not
be taken as conclusive, but rather that it be used as an
indicator.
4 . New Technology /Investments
In addition to Litton 1 s new shipyard discussed above
and the industry's increased utilization of modular tech-
niques, several other technical advancements and investments
in new facilities have been made. Some examples include the
following:
* Bethlehem, Sparrow's Pt. , has built a large





Avondale has completed a. new $40 million production
line for construction of LNG tankers and LASH
vessels
.
Newport News is presently developing a new $106
million yard adjacent to its present site to build
LNG tankers. Included in the new facility will be
the country's largest building basin (1,600 feet
long)
.
General Dynamics, Quincy, has expended $5.5 million
for capital improvements, primarily on the conver-
sion of two shipbuilding ways into graving docks.
Considering the large amounts that have been spent on
capital improvements in the past few years,- it is apparent
that the nation's shipbuilding industry considered future
business potential profitable. It would be interesting to
know what impact the present state of the economy and the
world's recent depressed tanker situation has had on the
industry's expectations for the future.
D. LZaBOR IN THE U.S. SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY
The shipbuilding industry is reputed to be highly labor-
intensive. Approximately 42% of the total cost of construc-
tion of a standard 89,000 dwt tanker may be attributed to
direct and indirect labor [51, p. 9]. With a highly complex
Naval vessel, the percentage of direct labor cost is even
greater. As of December 19 73, naval and major private
shipyard plant employees totaled 89,415 of which 75 , 094 were
considered production workers [51, p. 20]. Total commercial
49

shipbuilding and repair industry employment and the percentage




The shipbuilding and repair industry employs many
diverse types of skilled and semi-skilled labor. These skills
include pipefitter, welders, shipfitters, machinists, elec-
tricians and electronic technicians. In addition, U.S. ship-
yards employ design, engineering, management and administra-
tive personnel. Most U.S. shipyards utilize the following
seven skill levels for breaking down their work force data:
(1) Management, Administration (2) Professional, Engineering
(3) Professional, technical (4) Production, skilled (5) Pro-
duction, semi-skilled (6) Production, unskilled (7) Nonpro-
duction [32, pp. 367-484].
2
.
Competition with Other I ndustries
The U.S. shipbuilding and repair industry competes
with other industries for its 5 skilled labor, particularly
TABLE 12
PRODUCTION WORKERS IN PRIVATE U.S. SHIPBUILDING
AND REPAIR INDUSTRY; 1969-74 (SIC 3731)
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
-[g^
Total employees 142.9 130.2 128.2 134.5 138.3 148.9
(000)
Production workers 117.7 106.3 104.7 107.2 109.7 117.3
(000)
Percent Production 82.3 81.6 81.7 79.7 79.3 7 8.8
Workers
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
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with the construction industry, where wage rates are gener-
ally higher.
Although U.S. shipyards attempt to maintain a
constant work force despite fluctuations in orders, lay-offs
of 50% to 75% of a yard's work force is not uncommon when
shipbuilding orders are slack [31, p. 25]. In many instances,
when the yard attempts to recall their employees after a lay-
off, they find that their most productive and highly trained
workers have taken other jobs and are lost to their former
employer [31, p. 25].
3. Union Affiliations
In most of the larger U.S. shipyards, employees are
union affiliated. The primary unions representing employees
of U.S. shipyards are the Industrial Union of Marine and
Shipbuilding Workers of America (UMSWA) , The International
Association of Machinists (IAM) , The International Brother-
hood of Boilermakers , Iron Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths, Forgers
and Helpers, and the International Brotherhood of Electrical




Several large U.S. shipyards have their own apprentice
schools where it takes about four years to train a man to be
a journeyman in the shipbuilding trade [35, p. 1215]. There
has been a prevalent shortage of skilled manpower in the
industry for the past eight years and many shipyards have
had to resort to heavy advertising and recruiting programs
in an attempt, to attract skills from other industries.
51

5. Total Shipyard Labor Force
A sample of 74,338 employees in major U.S. shipyards
taken between April, 1970 and February, 19 72 showed a break-
down of the labor force as indicated in Tables 13 through 17
[32, pp. 96-7]
.
E. GOVERNMENTAL INFLUENCES ON THE U.S. SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY
There are multitudinous public policies which have at
least an indirect effect on the U.S. shipbuilding industry.
It is the purpose of this section to identify those policies
which are considered to be of major importance in the struc-
ture of the industry.
There are two government agencies which are primarily
responsible for coordination and execution of public policies
in the U.S. shipbuilding industry: The Department of Com-
merce (Maritime Administration) and the Department of
Defense (U.S. Navy).
-*- • Maritime Adminis tration (MarAd)
The first comprehensive peacetime formulation of
maritime policy, the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, contained
an opening statement of policy which is still in effect
[45, p. 10]
:
Sec. 101. It is necessary for the national defense and
development of its foreign and domestic commerce that the
United States shall have a merchant marine (a) sufficient
to carry its domestic waterborne commerce and a substan-
tial portion of the waterborne export and import foreign
commerce of the United States and to provide shipping
service on all routes essential for maintaining the flow
of such domestic and foreign waterborne commerce at all
times, (b) capable of serving as a naval and military





Clarification Number Percent Range in P:r< ent
Management, administrative 8,867 11.9 1.1 • 17.1
Piofessional, engineering 5,617 7.6 0.6 13.1
Professional, technical 6/136 8.7 1.1 - 28.0
Production, skilled 30,842 41.5 19.1 - 76.1
Production, semiskilled 10,701 14.4 6.5 - 14.4
Production, unskilled 6,865 9.2 0.9 - 17.6
Nonproduction 5,010 6.7 1.5 - 6.7
ToUd 74,338 100.0%
TABLE 14
AGE DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYEES
Percent of Employees
Design and Management
Age Production Service Engineering and Administration
Below 25 21.0 17.4 17.3 15.9
26 • 30 17.8 145 17.8 159
31 - 40 22.1 19.6 24.7 23.6
41 - 50 17.8 21.1 20.6 22.2
51 - 60 16.1 22.4 16.4 19.5
Over 60 S2 5.0 3.2 29
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0




YEARS OF SERVICE OF EMPLOYEES
Percent of Employ ees
Years of De sign and Management
Service Production Service Engineering and Admiristriticn
1 42.8 23.9 23.1 23.3
2 • 5 29.3 26 9 38.6 39.1
6 - 10 11.
1
17.9 19.2 21.0
11-20 11.8 18.7 14.1 12.S
Over 20 50 126 5.0 4.1
Total 1C0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0























Category Size School College Degree _School ,
Sales 3 .. 67.0 _ 33.0
Administrative 438 22.8 54 6 7.3 15.3
Production 1.389 71.2 13.6 1.1 14 1
Planning and
Control 1.636 64.9 23.7 0.9 10.5
Estimating 55 14.6 27 3 3.6 54.5
Design and
Eng.necnng 753 31.4 50.9 5.8 11.9
Drifting 341 34.9 23.7 -- 364
Research and
l>vtl .'1'iitcnt 9 — 55.6 11.1 33.3
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(c) owned and operated under the United States flag by
citizens of the United States insofar as may be practicable,
(d) composed of the best-equipped, safest, and most suit-
able types of vessels, constructed in the United States and
manned with a trained and efficient citizen personnel, and
(e) supplemented by efficient facilities for shipbuilding
and repair. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
United States to foster the development and encourage the
maintenance of such a merchant marine.
The Maritime Administration was formed to carry out
the stated policy. According to the Maritime Administrator,
the Maritime Administration is charged with the administra-
tion of those federal laws which have, as their purpose, the
promotion and maintenance of a competitive and efficient
merchant marine which is capable of meeting our nation's
defense and commercial trade requirements. The MarAd pro-
vides assistance to the shipbuilding and ship operating
industries in the areas of ship design and construction,
promoting use of U.S. flag vessels, development of advanced
transportation systems and shipboard equipment, and financial
support to eliminate cost advantages available to other
foreign shipbuilders and operators. For national security,
the MARAD maintains the National Defense Reserve Fleet,
supports military operations and assures the adequacy of the
shipbuilding mobilization base. Other missions of the MarAd
are to provide train i.ng for maritime manpower for both peace-
time and emergency requirements , and plan for the development
of the nation's ports [38, p. 60].
a. Construction Subsidies
The Construction Differential Subsidy (CDS) is
the primary direct means of subsidization bo the U.S.
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shipbuilding industry. This subsidy is utilized to offset
the difference in costs of U.S. versus foreign ships. Any
U.S. shipyard or U.S. citizen may apply for CDS to aid in
the construction of a vessel to be used in the foreign com-
merce of the United States. The CDS is paid directly to the
shipyard in the form of progress payments in accordance with
the provisions of payment specified in the contract between
buyer and builder, as approved by the Secretary of Commerce
[45, p. 26].
The amount of the reduction in the selling price
(CDS) may equal, but not exceed, the excess of the bid of
the shipbuilder constructing the proposed vessel (excluding
the cost of any features incorporated in the vessel for
national defense uses, which shall be paid by the Secretary
of Commerce in addition to the subsidy) , over the fair and
reasonable estimate of cost of constructing that type of
vessel if it were constructed under similar plans and speci-
fications (excluding national defense features) in a low-cost
foreign shipyard [45, p. 28], Japanese shipyards are normally
used for comparison due to their low-cost competitive base.
In FY1974, CDS expenditures amounted to $200,344,000 with all
known CDS contracts remaining within the statutory limits of
39%.
CDS payments have a statutory limit of 37% in
FY1975 and 35% in FY1976. Only vessels suitable for foreign
service and military service in a national emergency can
quality for CDS payments. Vessels built with the aid of CDS

must be registered under U.S. flag for at least 25 years (20
years for tankers and other liquid bulk carriers) [45, p. 28].
b. Mobilization Base
Sec. 502(f) of the 1936 Act, as ammended,
requires the Secretaries of Commerce and Navy to annually
review the existing privately owned shipyards capable of
merchant ship construction to determine whether their capa-
bilities provide an adequate mobilization base at strategic
points for purposes of national defense and national emer-
gency. If deficiencies are noted, the Secretary of Commerce
may, after considering all aspects and impacts, award con-
struction to deficient shipyards in the interest of national
defense [45, p. 91].
For national defense purposes, the shipyard
capabilities needed are based on four requirements : (1)
breakout of the National Defense Reserve Fleet, (2) replace-
ment of vessels lost to the enemy, (3) repair of merchant
and naval vessels, (4) construction of merchant and naval
vessels [31, p. 242]
.
It would be interesting to explore past MarAd/
Navy contracts in the shipbuilding industry in order to note
any trends in awards to shipyards which were not in a position
to maintain an "adequate" base, if determinable.
c. Reserve Fleet
MarAd maintains the National Defense Reserve
Fleet (NDRF) in order to provide merchant ships for military
operations or commercial shipping crises. Since 1960, the
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size of this fleet has steadily decreased from approximately
2,000 ships to 541 in 1973 [50, p. 40]. As of June 30, 1973,
the status of the Reserve Fleet Ships are listed in Table 18.
TABLE 18
SHIPS IN RESERVE FLEET AS OF JUNE 30, 1973
Scrap and Spec. m , ,Retention
_, . , %. , . -,-, • TotalCannibalization Pro j
.
James River, Va. 130
Mobile, Ala. -
Beaumont, Tex. 52












Custodial account only, ships transferred to State of
Alabama.
Source: MarAd [50, p. 41].
d. Indirect Subsidies
The remainder of MarAd administered policies are
considered
. to be "indirect" in their relationship to the U.S.
shipbuilding industry. These policies are primarily oriented
toward U.S. shippers, however, they are mentioned briefly in
that they have an impact on the demand for shipbuilding and
guaranteed payments to the shipbuilders.
( ! ) Qpe rating Dif ferential Subsidy (OPS ) . This
subsidy is a contractual agreement between the government and
a U.S. shipping company engaged in the foreign commerce of
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the U.S. Under the ODS program, payments are made directly
to the shipper to make up the difference between the opera-
tive expenses incurred (wages, insurance, maintenance/repair,
etc. ) and the same expenses which would have been incurred
under a representative low-cost foreign flag operator.
( 2 ) Loan Guarantees/Lease Financing/Insurance of
Financing . These forms of indirect subsidies are available
to ship operators at attractive terms and are discussed in
the Financing section.
2 . U.S. Navy
The number of active U.S. Naval vessels has been
steadily declining from a maximum of 976 ships in FY196 8 to
a level of 503 ships in FY1974 [23, p. 9]. A major factor in
this decline was the need for modernization of a fleet which
was increasing in age and obsolescence. Under austere
budget levels, only by giving up a large number of older
ships was the Navy able to make available the funds needed
for modernization [35, p. 9 85]. The Navy ship modernization
program has been in effect for several years and in FY1975,
it is expected that there will be more ships procured than
retired [35, pp. 1042-3].
a. Navy Shipyards
The U.S. Navy operates eight public shipyards.
At present, these shipyards are engaged only in conversion,
repair and overhaul of Navy ships and have not been involved
in any new construction since 196 7. Only three Navy ship-
yards now have the capability for new construction
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(Philadelphia, Mare Island, and Puget Sound) . It has been a
stated policy of the U.S. Navy that it does not intend to
shift its' shipbuilding from private to N£ivy yards except as
a backup in the event private shipbuilders become saturated
with commercial work [24, p. 3].
By a controlling provision in the FY19 7 4 appro-
priation bill, the Navy was directed by Congress to allocate
30% of it's ship overhaul/repair/alterations to private
shipyards [23, p. 10].
b. Naval Reserve Fleet
The Navy also maintains active Naval Reserve
Force (NRF) ships and an inactive Reserve Fleet of "moth-
balled" naval ships which are subject to recall for active
duty if required. As of June 30, 1974, active NRF ships
totaled 68 [35, p. 1065]. Additionally, the total number of
Navy ships in the inactive Navy fleet was estimated at 76 8
vessels [57, p. 4 8].
^ * P re feren ti a 1/P ro te ct i
v
e P rac t i ces
These practices are again primarily directed to the
shipping industry with an indirect effect on shipbuilding,,
repair, conversion and overhaul.
a. Military Cargo Act of 1904
This act requires military cargo to be carried
in U.S. flag vessels.
b. Merchant Marine Act of 1920
Commonly known as the "Jones Act," it primarily




c. Cargo Preference Act (PL 664)
This Act requires that at least 50% of all
government-impelled cargo be shipped in U.S. flag vessels.
The cargo is measured in tonnage and also by revenue. In
19 73, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (DOA) and Agency
for International Development (AID) shipments accounted for
over 9 8% of all non-military preference cargoes moving under
this act [50, p. 29]
.
d. Public Resolution 17
P.R. 17 reserves all Export-Import Banking
generated cargoes for U.S. flag vessels unless waived by
MarAd [50, p. 30]
.
e. Trade Agreements
Basic U.S. trade agreements are common, particu-
larly in the agriculture theatre. A typical example is the
U.S. /USSR grain agreement of 19 72 which called for 1/3 of
the purchased grain to be carried in U.S. flag vessels.
4. Ship Procurement Practices
The details of government procu.remer.it practices is
beyond the scope of this study. However,, a brief comparison
of MarAd/Private and Navy practices will be mentioned to
provide a general background.
a . MarAd
When MarAd enters into a construction differen-
tial subsidy procurement, it eillows the buyer and shipyard
to negotiate the basic contract. Details of the proposed
contract are then evaluated by MarAd representatives prior
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to final approval. The approval process includes evaluation
of specifications, prices, labor rates, etc. During construc-
tion, a minimum amount of contract administration is per-
formed by MarAd representatives.
b. U.S. Navy
Because there is no private buyer, U.S. Navy ship
procurements are governed by the Armed Services Procurement
Regulations (ASPR) . Due to the complexity of Naval ships,
most procurements are now conducted through the negotiation
process after a series of feasibility studies and conceptual
approval. In general, the Navy follows the provisions of
DOD INST 5000.1 which calls for cost type contracts where
substantial development efforts are involved, usually for
design and development of lead ship(s). Fixed-price type
contracts are normally utilized for follcw-on production
runs of a major ship acquisition [5, p. 5], The time required
from concept to development varies according to the complex-
ity of the Naval ship involved but in many instances may
exceed two years.
a. Buy American Act
Title 41 of the United States Code, Section 10,
requires that manufactured articles, materials and supplies
which are purchased for public use must be mined or produced
in the United States, and only such manufactured articles,
materials and supplies as have been manufactured in the U.S.
substantially all from articles, materials and supplies mined,
6 2

produced or manufactured in the U.S. The implementing order
for Section 10 established a rule that materials were to be
considered foreign in origin if the cost of the foreign
products used in such materials constituted 50% or more of
the costs of ail the products used in such materials. An
ammendment to the FY19 65 Military Appropriations Bill has
required that no major component of the hull or superstruc-
ture of a Naval vessel may be built in any foreign shipyard.
Also, another ammendment in FY19 68 prohibits the construction
of any Naval vessel in a foreign shipyard for which funds are
appropriated [37, p. 2297].
7\lthough restrictive in nature, the provisions of
the Buy American Act are tighter for the Merchant Marine.
Not only must the ship be built in the U.S., but only
articles, materials and supplies of the growth, production
or manufacture of the U.S. may be used unless they would
cause late delivery of the vessel in which case they m >y be
waived by the Secretary of Commerce [37, p. 2297].
b. Environmental/Health/Safety/Social Programs
Public policies in this area have had a signifi-
cant impact in the cost of U.S. ships. A recent study
(Todd 1973) estimates an increase of about 13.88% in the
hourly billing rate on a vessel due to legislation in these
programs [32, p. 1121].
c. Defense Production Act of 19 50
This act authorizes the establishment of priori-
ties in the performance of Defense contracts and the
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allocation of materials and facilities for promoting national
defense.
F. BARRIERS TO ENTRY
^ • Absolute Cost Barriers
Initial capital investment in a U.S. shipyard is




The industry has experienced great difficulty in
obtaining skilled labor in many sectors of the U.S. High
turnover rates and extensive recruiting programs by major
shipyards are prevalent [31, p. 25], Apprentice schools at
local shipyards are a prime source of labor input, however,
turnover rates/layoffs pose a unique problem in maintaining
a satisfactory labor base.
3 Profitability
Major U.S. shipyards aire subject to low profits and
return on total assets. A study conducted by Knight in 1971
revealed the following information for an average major
shipyard:
a. It takes roughly one dollar of assets to generate
two dollars of revenue per year.
b. Net income after taxes is less than two percent
of revenues.
c. Return on total assets is three percent to four
percent [32, p. 103].
6 4

4 • Uncertainty of Orderbook
The intense pressure of the Congress in appropriating
funds for U.S. Navy shipbuilding programs and occasional cut-
backs in both dollars and quantities have established a
relevant degree of uncertainty in Navy shipbuilding programs.
Long-term programs of multiple ships have been subject to
cutbacks with resultant increases in per unit costs.
Fluctuations in shipping demand and the world trade
picture adds an additional element of uncertainty to the
industry.
5 * Governmen t Control
Due to the prevalence of government control in the
industry, necessitated by a poor competitive position in
world shipbuilding, it is suggested that the depth of govern-
ment involvement, in itself, discourages new entries. By
maintaining more stringent controls over the normal economic
structure of an industry, the government, may, in effect,
inhibit initiative, technical innovation and economic oppor-
tunities normally found in other less controlled industries.
G. DEMAND FOR SHIPBUILDING
1 . Merchant Ships
Demand for U.S. merchant ships is basically a function
of the demand for that type vessel in world or domestic trade.
Demand and supply of shipping are subject to large fluctua-
tions of overcapacity and lack of availability. Primary
causes of these fluctuations are economic, political and
military or strategic factors. World shipping rates tend to
G5

follow the shipping demand and supply relationship and fluctu-
ations in shipping rates indicate the existence of a period-
icity of about four to five years. As the costs of shipping
are driven higher by demand, new orders are placed with
shipbuilders for new construction and expansion efforts are
undertaken by the shipping companies. As rates fall, there
is a subsequent reduction in new shipbuilding orders and as
rates continue to fall, existing ships may be laid up or
scrapped [7, p. 3].
2 U.S. Navy Ships
Demand for Naval vessels is a function of threat
assessments, mission area deficiencies, fleet obsolescence
and budget constraints. Shipbuilding programs must be broken
down to number and per-unit cost elements in order to present
the program to the Congress. Navy shipbuilding programs are
normally funded by Congress on a fiscal year-to-year basin,
H. METHODS OF FINANCING
1 . Private
The Merchant Marine Act of 19 70 was passed in an
effort to increase our merchant marine force. To achieve
this goal, construction and operating subsidies were extended
to the U.S. flag bulk trade, and new financing techniques
were developed. The following is a discussion of the dif-
ferent forms of vessel financing that are currently available
to U.S. shipping companies.
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a. Construction-Differential Subsidy (CDS)
Construction-differential subsidies, discussed
in greater detail in Section E, are granted in certain
qualified circumstances to prospective ship purchasers
(U.S. citizens or U.S. shipyards) to buy an American flag,
American-built ship. A change incorporated into the 19 70
Act allows U.S. shipyards to apply directly for subsidies.
The intent of the change v/as to encourage shipyard participa-
tion in the design of the vessel which would, lead to increased
economies in construction. In either case, the subsidy is
paid directly to the shipyard. Vessels operating under
"cabotage" (Jones Act) regulations are ineligible to use
this type of financing since they do not experience competi-
tion from foreign-flag vessels.
b. Loan Guarantees (Title XI Program)
Generally recognized as being the most successful
of all government activities associated with the merch;
marine, the Title XI Federal Ship Mortgage Insurance Program
(Loan Guarantee) makes long-term debt financing available
to shipowners through a revolving insurance fund of $5 billion
dollars, recently raised from $3 billion. Under this program,
the U.S. government insures commercial loans and mortgages
to finance a fixed percentage of the actual cost of construc-
tion, conversion or reconditioning of American-built and
documented vessels above five net tons.
The maximum extent of coverage varies from
75 - 87^% of actual costs depending on the size and intended
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use of the vessel, and whether CDS funds were used. The
construction loan is insured only for the period of construc-
tion, after which the ship must be financed through a
mortgage loan which may extend for the economic life, of the
vessel, not to exceed 2 5 years. Frankel points out that most
foreign countries will finance ships purchased from their
shipyards for a maximum duration of seven years [7, p. 533].
The major source of income to the Title XI
program is the annual guarantee premiums received by the
Maritime Administration (MarAd) . These premiums are prepaid
for the forthcoming year beginning on the day the guarantee
contract becomes effective. These payments are from the
shipowners to the government. The premium fee is determined
by MarAd officials based on the risk that they assume, which
is usually based on the company's financial position and
operating ability. Construction Loan Guarantee premiums
range from 1/4 to 1/2% of the guaranteed debt outstanding,
whereas Mortgage Debt Guarantee premiums range from 1/2 - 1%
on the outstanding debt.
In general, bonds guaranteed under Title XI
receive long-term interest rates comparable to those
received by prime credit organizations and other government
agencies. Merchant Marine bonds are usually sold at approx-
imately the same rates as are AAA utility bonds [7, p. 549].
The government requires that Merchant Marine bonds be sold
at 100% of face value [7, p. 549].
6 8

Though not a statutory requirement, MarAd prefers
that the principal of debt guaranteed under Title XI be
amortized on a straight-line basis.
c. Capital Construction Fund
The tax-deferred capital construction fund, a
form of indirect subsidy, has been in existence since 19 47.
The purpose of this fund is to provide the U.S. flag operator
some form of tax advantage (s) some foreign operators currently
enjoy.
The program operates by allowing eligible, ship-
ping companies to defer payment of income taxes by depositing
ordinary income and/or capital gains in a specially created
fund before paying taxes. Taxes remain unpaid as long as
this money is used for acquiring new vessels or related
equipment. However, the depreciation base of a new vessel
is reduced by the amount withdrawn from the fund to purchase
it. Thus, taxes are deferred, not exempted, since they are
eventually "repaid" in the form of reduced depreciation.
Prior to .19 70 only companies receiving ODS were
eligible to establish a capital construction fund. Elowever,
the law was amended by the 19 70 Act to allow any citizen of
the U.S. who owns or leases any vessel constructed and docu-
mented in the U.S. to establish a fund. The revised struc-
ture thereby extended eligibility to non-subsidized companies
as well.
d. Tax Incentives
The tax base upon which a company's tax liability
is fiqured is net income. The oresent tax rate is 22% on
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the first $25,000 plus 48% on any net income in excess of
$25,000. An important significance of this marginal tax
rate is in its use in capital budgeting or financing
decisions
.
The Internal Revenue Code of 19 5 4 allows a com-
pany to deduct reasonable depreciation of certain property
in establishing its tax base. The Code has established that
the guideline economic life for vessels and other similar
water transportation equipment is 18 years. The IRS has
allowed shipping companies to calculate yearly depreciation
using one of the following three methods: (1) Straight line,
which allows for an equal deprecition write-off each year;
(2) Sum of Years Digits, the "most accelerated" method
allowed under U.S. tax law (To take full advantage of this
method, a company has to make sufficient income in a given
year to cover the depreciation write-off.); (3) Double
Declining Balance, an accelerated method that allows for a
more rapid depreciation in early years yielding a higher net
tax shelter.
All interest payments on company debt as well as
lease payments on leased equipment are tax deductible.
The investment tax credit, reinstated by the
Revenue Act of 19 71, is designed to stimulate investment.
Under this law, a steamship company can take as a direct
deduction from its income liability 7% of the acquisition
cost of a new asset. The percentage of the credit is based
on the depreciable life of the asset, the maximum being 7%
for assets with depreciable lives of seven or more years.
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An important point is that the credit is only valid for the
year in which the asset is acquired.
An important tax benefit to shipping companies
is that 85% of the dividends earned on corporate securities
are exempt from taxation [7 , p. 527].
A provision of the Merchant Marine Act of 19 36
allows a shipping company to trade into the government an
obsolete ship for an allowance credit on the purchase price
of a new nessel. If a gain or loss is realized in this
transaction, it is not recognized for tax purposes. Capital
losses can never be deducted from ordinary income as a tax
shelter, but they can be carried forward up to five years to
offset capital gains.
e. Lease Financing
Lease financing was enhanced by the 19 70 Act eis
a means of attracting additional capital to the industry
while generating very low effective interest rates to the
operator (leasee) of the vessel. Since transportation
companies normally fail to generate large earnings early in
the operating life of the assets, many of the Lax benefits
were being wasted. The leverage lease allows financial
institutions to employ the tax benefits (which may have been
previously forgone by the ship buyer) and pass the rewards
on to the lessee in the form of an attractive lease rate.
For example, substantially lower (more than 3%) effective
interest rates have been obtained with leveraged leases
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than could have been obtained under the Title XI program
[32, pp.1015.. 1044-47] .
2 . Defense
Determining whether to enter into a contract financ-
ing program can be difficult because the government is func-
tioning both as a procuring agent and as a banker. In the
end the decision must be made as to how unstable a contractor
must be before the government refuses to accept the risks of
financing and, instead, chooses to go to a more expensive
contractor
.
The following forms of financing are currently avail-
able for use by defense procuring agents in providing
assistance to government contractors,
a. Private Financing
This is the most preferred method because of
minimal involvement on the part of the government. The
usual type is the commercial loan obtained by the contractor
from a private financial institution. A second type is one
in which the defense organization guarantees commercial
loans made to defense contractors or subcontractors. These
were commonly referred to as "V" loans. The third type is
where contractors assign to a lending institution monies due
them or to become due them under a government contract there-
by making it easier for them to borrow money.
b. Progress Payments
Progress payments are made to a contractor as
work progresses on Navy contracts. They are based on either
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costs incurred, percentage of completion, or a particular
stage of completion. They are used only with fixed-price
contracts and fixed-price subcontracts under cost reimburse-
ment prime contracts, providing funds in advance of delivery
to help in financing long- lead time procurements. For most
procurements, progress payments are based on costs incurred.
However, a recent change pertaining to shipbuilding, ship
repair, and ship conversion involves progress payment pro-
cedures under fixed-price and fixed-price incentive contracts.
These new procedures will result in shipbuilding progress
payments being based on a combination of costs incurred and
physical progress rather than solely on a percentage or stage
of completion [43, p. 2711]. The patrol frigate and Trident
submarine programs were planned to be the first contracts to
contain the new progress payment provisions [43, p. 271b].
c. Advance Payments
Advance payments are advances of money made by
the government to a contractor in anticipation of performance.
This method of government financing is least preferred
because it imposes the greatest administrative burden on the
government.
Advance payments may be made when it is determined
that they are in the public interest or to facilitate the
national defense (PL85-804)
.
This method of financial assistance requires the




1. Nuclear Powered Naval Vessels
For several years, Congress has advocated the con-
struction of surface Navy warships over 8,000 tons as
nuclear powered. This desire by Congress was reconfirmed in
19 72 when intense pressure was exerted on the Navy to re-




As previously stated, public shipyards are engaged
in repair/overhaul/conversion work only and it does not
appear likely they will engage in new construction in the
near future. Additionally, the Navy has been directed by
Congress to increase its repair/overhaul work in private
shipyards to 30%. This percentage is expected to remain a
minimum requirement and could possibly increase if more pres-
sure is applied by the industry on Congress.
3* U.S. Sh :ipy". rd Expansions
Nearly $500 million has been spent by U.S. shipyards
for improvements and modernizations in the past five years.
Another estimated $500 million has either been authorj zed or
committed for new or improved facilities for both private
and public U.S. shipyards [23, p. 13]. This large amount of
capital expansion appears to be the industry's response to
increasing demand for tankers and liquified natural gas (LNG)
ship orders.
^ • Trans-Alaskan Pipe li ri_e
Construction of the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline system is
planned for completion in mid-19 77. As a result of
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construction authorization in 1974, there has been a marked
increase in demand for U.S. flag crude oil tankers. Under
the Jones Act (1920), only U.S. flag vessels may be utilized
for the trade from Alaska to CONUS ports. Merchant vessels
ordered in 19 7 3 and 19 74 were predominantly large crude oil




Energy Transportation Security Act of 19 74
In December 1974, Congress passed a controversial
oil preference bill which required, by FY1976, at least 20%
of all oil imports to the U.S. be carried by U.S. flag
vessels (increasing to 30% in 1977). This bill was pocket
vetoed by the President, however it has a strong chance of
becoming Public Law this year. The U.S. flag share of oil
imports at present is approximately 5%. Passage of the Bill
would have a marked affect on the U.S. shipbuilding tanker
business. Estimates of from 25 to 30 million dwt would be
required to support this legislation. Presently, the U.S.
flag fleet has approximately 8 million dwt afloat and produc-
tion output is about 1 million dwt per year [56, p. 29].
6 Labor to Capital Intensive
New technology, capital investment, and a general
trend toward series production of standardized ships is





7. Sales to Other Nations
On August 27, 19 74, the U.S. Navy concluded an agree-
ment to sell six new DD-963 destroyers to Iran. Each
destroyer will cost roughly $110 million. Increased activity
in defense sales to Middle East nations may call for further
Navy ship sales in 19 75.
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IV . CONDUCT OF THE U.S. SHIPBUILDIN G INDUSTRY
A. INTRODUCTION
It was the original intent of this chapter to gather
individual company conduct data such as bidding, pricing,
contracting decisions, etc. However, we were unable to
develop sufficient data in this area and thus, of necessity,
the concept of conduct in this chapter is more generalized
and the careful threads from structure to conduct in the U.S.
shipbuilding industry have become clouded.
B. PUBLIC POLICY CONDUCT IN U.S. SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY
1. MarAd
a. Construction Differential Subsidy
In Fiscal Year 19 74, MarAd awarded CDS contracts
for twelve new vessels for foreign trade service. A total
of $2 80.7 million in CDS payments were to be made on these
vessels for a total contract price of $756 million. These
payments represent an average CDS payment of 23.4% and no
ship was contracted over the 39% CDS limit for FY1974. All
twelve vessels were tankers, three of which were rated at
390,770 dwt. As of July 1, 19 74, the total number of CDS
vessels ordered since the 1970 ammendment to the Merchant
Marine Act amounted to 59 oceangoing ships with a total con-
tract value of over $3 billion [55, p.78] r
Data for ships contracted under construction sub-
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Source: Department of Commerce, MarAd [55, p. 81] [50, p. 69]
b. Mobilization Base
As noted in Chapter III, the Secretaries of Com-
merce and Navy are required to annually review shipyards
capable of merchant ship construction in order to determine
adequacy of the mobilization base. Research efforts to
determine if these provisions have recently been carried out
have not been successful. However, the Department cf Com-
merce and the Navy do exchange data on most of the private
shipbuilding facilities in the U.S.
In 1973, the Commission on American Shipbuilding
reported that a recent study by MarAd indicated that the
shipbuilding industry had only one- third of the required
output capacity for constructing commercial ships in a sus-
tained conflict [31, p. 2 42].

c. Reserve Fleet
During FY19 73, 15 merchant ships were placed in
the MarAd Reserve Fleet and 143 were sold for scrap or non-
transportation use for a total of approximately $12.6
million. From 195 8 through 19 73, a total of 2,015 Reserve
Fleet vessels have been sold for scrap or nontransportation
use for a total of roughly $12 8.6 million [50, p. 41].
Additionally, the Mobile, Alabama fleet was phased out on
April 30, 1973.
During FY1972, MarAd initiated a program to
evaluate techniques for rapidly and economically bringing
inactive Reserve Fleet "Victory" ships to a ready-for-service
status. The technique utilized was to survey the 12 3 Victory
ships in the Reserve Fleet, thus producing ei breakout
sequence for each fleet, complete reactivation and repair
specifications, etc. The survey was completed in FY19 73 and
according to MarAd the process of activating the Victory
ships could now be accomplished at minimal cost and in the
least possible time [50, p. 41].
d. Other
ODS payments for FY1970 through 1974 are listed
in Table 20.
As of January 1, 19 75, there were 91 merchant
ships under construction or on order from private U.S. ship-
yards. The orderbook included 74 tankers, 7 intermodal
carriers, 7 drybulk carriers and 3 special-type vessels with
a total value in excess of $4.3 billion. Additionally, two




ODS DATA FOR FY19 70 TO 19 7 4
FY 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
Companies with 23Long-term Contracts
Ships Covered 247 206 207 185 177
205.7 268.0 235.6 216.8 226.5Total SubsidyPaid (ooo's)
Source: Department of Commerce, MarAd [55, p. 81] [50, p. 69].
2. U.S. Navy
a. Shipbuilding Programs
(1) Tables 21 and 22 list the latest available
status of Navy shipbuilding activities.
b. Build and Charter Program
In June of 1972, the Military Sealift Command
(MSC) of the U.S. Navy entered into a long-term leasing
arrangement of tankers by having private offerors obtain
necessary funds for the construction of the tankers, with
the Navy guaranteeing that it would lease the vessels for 20
years. The tankers would be manned by M.S.C. civil service
merchant seamen and would provide fueling services to U.S.
Navy ships. By leasing instead of purchasing, the Navy was
able to obtain badly needed tankers through operation and
maintenance (O&M) funds whereas they were unsuccessful in
obtaining appropriations for construction of their own
tankers through Ship Construction and Conversion (SCN) funds




NAVY SHIPBUILDING ACTIVITY FOR
CALENDAR YEARS 1970-19 7 3
1970 1971 1972 1973
Ships Under Construction Jan- 1 103 82 64 57
Ships Ordered During the. Year 6 15 14 7
Ships Delivered During the Year 32 33 21 8
Ships Under Contract Dec. 31 82 64 57 56
Source: SCA [23, p. 31]
TABLE 22
NAVAL VESSELS UNDER CONSTRUCTION OR ON ORDER IN
PRIVATE SHIPYARDS AS OF JANUARY 1, 19 7 4
Type No. of Total LightVessels Disp.Tons
Replenishment Oiler (AOR)




Guided Missile Frigate (Nuclear) (DLGN)
Amphibious Assault Ship (Special) (LHA)
Patrol Frigate (PF)
Attack Submarine (Nuclear) (SSN)
TOTALS
Approximate Value of unfinished Naval work in Private Ship-














As a result of this action, considerable contro-
versy was initiated over the legality of the issue, the costs
to the government, and the impact of future decisions of this
nature. Basically, leasing to the MSC was not a requirement
for specific congressional authorization and approval through
the formal SCN appropriation process. A Government Account-
ing Office (GAO) report in 1973 revealed that at a discount
3
rate of 8 -.-% , there was little difference in the present
value between leasing and purchasing. However, applying a
3discount rate above 8 j% made the present value of leasing
3
more economical whereas a rate below 8 ~% made a buy arrange-
ment more economical [35, p. 1104].
There appears to be little opposition to the
Build and Charter program at the present time, particularly
with the manpower shortages and funding restrictions of the
Navy. The program consists of nine tankers, each with a
displacement of 25,000 dwt. Contractors to build the nine
tankers and their prices are listed in Table 23.
TABLE 2 3
NAVY BUILD AND CHARTER PROGRAM













c. Defense Production /vet (DPA) 1950
In early 1974, upon advice by the U.S. Navy, the
Department of Defense recommended to the Office of Prepared-
ness, the withholding of certain steel priorities for mer-
chant vessel construction under the DPA. Granting defense
priorities had become almost automatic in the post WW II
excess capacity era and the withholding of priorities by the
Office of Preparedness had a marked impact on the U.S. ship-
building industry. The DOD ' s interpretation of the DPA in
this case indicated that each merchant ship must have a
direct military value. As a result of this interpretation,
Todd Shipyards, Inc. was denied a steel priority to build
400,000 dwt tankers in a new shipyard in Galveston, Texas
.
Subsequently, Todd cancelled plans for a $10 million expan-
sion in its Galveston facility [30, p. 28],
Steel shortages and increased interest in commer-
cial contracts by U.S. shipbuilders appear to have been the
underlying reasons for this conduct by the Navy. In additi<
Avondaie shipyard has reported being almost 25% behind
schedule in construction of two LNG carriers which were
denied steel priorities [30, p. 28]. The priorities under
the DPA are most important to the U.S. shipbuilding industry
in merchant ship construction due to the strict limitations





On 2 4 January 19 75, Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry
Dock Co. announced a reduction of about 2000 employees by
June 1975. Newport News' president cited the following
reasons for the employee reduction:
a. The present state of the nation's economy
b. Increased cost of overhead items in 19 75
c. Increased labor costs in 19 75
d. Existing fixed-ceiling-price contracts, which were
90% of present yard contracts, did not fully cover
escalating costs
e. Uncertainty of Navy's future shipbuilding plans
because of unresolved budgetary considerations
f. Continuing necessity to perform costly, and often
duplicative, adminis tration tasks
g. The President's veto of the Energy Transportation
Securi ty Act
h. Delay in construction of new commercial ship-
building facilities [24, p.l] [19, p. 2]
C. LABOR UTILIZATION
1 . Total Labor Force
Total U.S. Shipyard labor has been slowly increasing
in private U.S. shipyards while a general decrease has
occurred in public yards as indicated in Table 24.
On June 29 and July 1, 1974, the Navy closed Hunter's
Point and Boston Naval Shipyards respectively. These




TOTAL U.S. SHIPYARD EMPLOYMENT:
ALL EMPLOYEES
(In Thousands)
1971 1972 1973 1974 (est)
Avg. Private 130.6 138..L 144.4 156.4
Avg. Naval 75.5 70.1 64.5 64.1
TOTAL 206.1 208.2 208.9 220.5
Source: SCA [25, pp. 1-2]
the closing of 2 74 military installations in 32 states and
the higher costs of work in public versus private shipyards
[23, p. 10] .
2 • Strikes, Walkouts, Union Contracts
In general, U.S. shipyards have been relatively free
of labor strikes in the past few years. In 19 73, Bethlehem
Steel had a nine day work stoppage at its five shipyards.
One other Maryland shipyard was idled for a 91 day period
before a new contract agreement was reached [50, p. 38]. Pre
liminary information for 1974 indicates two work stoppages
for less than one month each in major U.S. shipyards. Labor
contracts have been generally negotiated for 3 years but five
year contracts have appeared on occasion [31, p. 25].
3 . Wages
A comparison of shipbuilding and other industry weekly
earnings is listed in Table 25. It can be seen from Table 25




AVERAGE WEEKLY EARNINGS IN SELECTED INDUSTRIES
„, . , .-,-, Duraole _. -. ,„,. ContractYear Shipbuilding ~ , Aircraft Mfg. „Goods Construction
1968 $14 5 $132 $153 $123 $16 5
1969 155 140 163 130 181
1970 158 143 171 134 196
1971 163 153 179 142 213
1972 173 167 19 3 155 224
1973 178 179 208 165 241
Source: SCA, Bureau of Labor Statistics [25, p. 9]
with other industries. This may be due to low profits in the
industry and a less stronger bargaining position of the ship-
building unions.
^ • Availabi lity
There is presently a shortage of skilled labor in the
shipbuilding industry. A recent study by MarAd in March of
19 74 concluded that shortages in the availability of skilled
labor would occur in several labor markets with concentrated
shipbuilding and repair facilities. Additionally, it was
noted that apprentice programs were not emphasized in most
private shipyards. Gnly three shipyards (Bath, Newport News,
Electric Boat) hod programs of any magnitude. Other conclu-
sions were that the requirements for skilled manpower in U.S.
Commercial shipyards would increase eight to twelve percent
for the next two years and that a major impediment to planned

shipyard expansions would be significant shortages of skilled
labor [35, p. 1226]
.
It has been suggested that many of the skilled ship-
yard workers are hesitant, even reluctant, to move when laid
off. Litton had great difficulties enticing skilled labor to
its Ingalls yard in the early 70 's and more recently, Charles-
ton Naval Shipyard encountered major problems in filling
skill shortages even after two Navy shipyards were closed
(Boston, Hunters Point) and the skilled workers at those
yards were offered a move at the government's expense [35,
p. 1215]
-
Table 26 lists the shipyard turnover rates for 1969-
19 73. It can be seen that although the separations per 10
employees has been lower in the last two years, so has the
number of accessions and there is only a slightly greater
average accession per 100 employees (.4) than separation.
D. IMPACT OF FINANCING ON THE SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY
Nearly all ship construction is financed with borrowed
money which may be obtained from either private or federal
agencies. Within the last few years, shipowners have
utilized U.S. ship financing techniques effectively [23,
p. 13] .
The different financing elements for which data has been
obtained and their impact on the shipbuilding industry will




LABOR TURNOVER RATES IN THE SHIPBUILDING AND REPAIR INDUSTRY
Avg. Total Accessions Avg. Separations
Per 100 Employees Per 100 Employees
New Total Total
T f^ f-l V*
Hires Other Avg. Quits Layoffs Other Avg.
1969 5.0 3.3 8.3 3.0 3.7 1.3 8.0
1970 3.7 4.6 7.3 2.2 4.6 1.3 8.1
1971 3.9 4.7 8.6 2.0 5.3 1.3 8.6
19 72 3.9 4.2 8.1 2.1 4.2 1.5 7.8
1973 4.8 3.1 7.9 2 .
7
j . 3 1.5 7.5
Labor turnover is gross movement of wage and salary workers
into and out of employed status with respect to indi-
vidual establishments.
Accessions are total number of permanent and temporary addi-
tions to the employment role, including both new and
rehired employees.
New Hires are temporary or permanent additions to employment
roil of persons who have never before been employed in
establishment
.
Other Accession s are all additions to e tployment roll which
are not classified as new hires, including transfers from
other establishments of company and employees recalled
from layoff.
Separations are terminations of employment classified accord-
ing to cause.
Quits are terminations initiated by the employees, failure to
report after being hired, unauthorized absence.
Layoffs are suspensions without pay lasting or expected to
last at least seven consecutive days.
Other Separations are termination of employment because of
discharge, permanent disability, death, retirement, trans-
fers to another establishment of the company, and entrance
into the Armed Forces for a period to last more than 3
consecutive days
.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
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1 • Ti tle XI Program
Nearly $1 billion in ship financing guarantees were
approved during FY1973 [50, p. 2]. This covered 95 vessels
and 450 lighters. At the end of FY1973, a total of 456
vessels and 2,171 lighters were insured under the Title XI
program [50, p. 9], The outstanding principal balance on
these ships totaled nearly $2.6 billion.
Several financing guarantee applications had not
been acted upon at year's end. These applications involved
the construction or conversion of 3 62 ships and 250 shipboard
lighters totaling about $1.4 billion [50, p. 9].
It is interesting to note that of the several bil-
lions (in excess of $35 billion since 1950) guaranteed by
the federal government since the inception of the Title XI
program (19 36) , only nine foreclosures have occurred as of
March 19 7 3 [44, p. 74]
.
2 • Cap ital Const x ucj ind
At the end of FY1973, 140 interim fund agreements had
been entered into with eligible shipping companies [50, p. 11],
It is anticipated that these agreements will result in
excess of $2 billion in new construction and conversion in
the next ten years [50, p. 11].
Six operators had a total balance of about $2.9
million in the construction reserve fund at the end of FY19 73
[50, p. 11]
.
3 . Tax Incen tives
In October 1973, the Internal Revenue Service adopted
a new Class Life Asset Depreciation Range System (ADR) for
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shipyard assets in accordance with the Revenue Act of 19 71.
The two main provisions include an asset life that can be
more firmly anticipated and a realization of significant
acceleration deductions through shortened depreciation
periods [23, p. 15].
4 . Discussion
Of particular current interest is the participation
of the oil companies in domestic ship construction. Their
participation appears to have been inhibited in part by the.
so-called "grandfather clause" requirement of the current lav;
that requires mixed foreign-f lag/U.S. -f lag fleets to phase
into total U.S. registry if ODS is to be earned on new ships
[32
, pp. 1020-1]. This condition is given as being a major
reason why the large international oil companies have shown
little interest in purchasing their tankers in the U»S. The
advantages enjoyed (e.g. lower operating costs, tax-free
environment) by parent firms in the continued operation c
foreign- flag vessels appear to outweigh the advantages pos-
sible through the U.S. program, with its ODS. .It is the
authors' opinion that these new tankers will be used in the
non-contiguous trade between Alaska and the continental U.S.
which makes them ineligible for ODS as stipulated in the
Jones i\ct.
E. SHIPBUILDING CLAIMS
The Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR) defines
the term claim as:
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a request for adjustment of a single contract involving to
a significant extent a 'constructive change 1 i.e.,
a change based on Government conduct, including actions
or inactions, which is not a formal written change order
but which has the effect of requiring the contractor to
perform work different from or in addition to that
prescribed by the original terms of the contract or
late or defective Government-furnished property or infor-
mation. Claim does not mean a request for equitable
adjustments solely for formal written change orders or
price adjustments pursuant to escalation or price redeter-
mination, provisions of Public Lav; 85-804, or other
contract assertions or adjustments not enumerated in the
preceeding sentence. When claims under two or more
contracts arise from the same theory of recovery, such
claims shall be treated as a claim within the definition
provided above.
Contractor claims for price increases have been a recur-
ring problem in Navy shipbuilding programs and the magnitude
of this problem has risen considerably during recent years.
Intense interest and concern in the problem has been shown
by high level leaders in Congress and DC: 1 . Several hearings
and investigations have been conducted in an effort to deter-
mine the "why" of these claims [42, pp. 1642-3, 1654-61] [36,
pp. 1249-51]
.
The most significant factors which contribute to the
"why" of contractor claims as brought out before the Sub-
committee on Priorities and Economy in Government in May 19 7
include the following [41, pp. 400-1]:
1. Inaccurate lead-yard plans
2. poorly written government specifications (i.e,
inconsistent, ambiguous, deficient, impossible to
perform)




4, Government furnished equipment, drawings and/or
information was delivered late or defective
5. Construction change orders and technical directions
received from someone other than the contracting
officer.
A discussion of both shipbuilder and Navy viewpoints con-
cerning the above listed factors follows. However, the
writers would like to mention at this point that both Mr.
David W. James, Jr. and Mr. Neil M. Ruttenberg , counsel and
deputy counsel (claims) respectively, former Naval Ships
Systems Command, have stated that the reason (s) for the claims
"cannot truly be found in the. shortsighted answers usually
heard, e.g. contractors' greed; the development of the 'con-
structive' change and 'constructive suspension of the wor] '
theories; and allegedly 'poor' contract administration by the
Navy bureaucracy; or even the growth of an aggressive, claims
oriented, private Government contracts bar" [53, p. 2]. They
go on to say that the reason is apparent; shipbuilders have
failed to make "satisfactory" profits and in some instances
have lost large amounts under their Navy contracts. They
state the real question is not "why claims?," but rather
"why losses?".
•*- • Inaccurat e Le ad Yard Plans
DOD Instruction 5000.1 of July 13, 1971, eliminated
the Total Package Procurement (TPP) concept, with the impli-
cation that contracts for different stages of the procurement
could well be expected to be performed by different contrac-
tors. It is not uncommon practice fcr follow-on shipyards to
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purchase their working plans from the lead yard because of
the high costs involved in preparing their own. Discrepan-
cies in the lead yard plans create disruptions and defective
results which increase the shipbuilders 1 costs. The Navy
has been accused of attempting to absolve itself from
accepting responsibility for discrepancies in the lead yard's
plans by including "appropriate" clauses in the contract.
Shipbuilders contend that they should not be expected to
absorb the full costs caused by such errors.
2 . Poorly-written Specifi cations
Shipbuilders cite poorly-written specifications as a
cause of additional costs. According to shipbuilders, the
full meaning of the Navy's specifications haven't been known
until after the contract has been awarded. This has been
given as one of the reasons why shipbuilders often bid too
low. In the end, the initial misunderstanding ends up cost-
ing the shipyard considerably more than they had antic
3- Unanticipated Increase in Quality^ Assurance
Requirements
Both the Navy and shipbuilders agree that in the last
few years there has been a significant increase in quality
assurance requirements. The Navy believes shipbuilders were
slow in recognizing the increased requirements and that many
of the claims resulting from the increased costs associated
with the added requirements could have been avoided if the
contract had contained appropriate provisions. Shipbuilders
argue that many of the increased requirements should never
have been required in the first place and that increased
y3

demands for quality assurance inspections have, too often,.
been applied indiscriminately across the board.
4 . Government Furnished Equipment and Drawings
Delivered Late or Defective
Another cause of additional costs frequently brought
out is the late delivery of government furnished material or
information. Such late deliveries cause delays, ripout and
rework. Frequently, late deliveries result when problems
arise in the development of new equipment and the contractor
fails to receive the necessary material as scheduled.
5 * Construetive Change Orders and Technical Directions
Received from Someone Other than the Contracting Officer
This is an example of a case where "the right hand
doesn't know what the left hand is doing." When a contractor
makes any changes to the project without the prior approval
of the contracting officer he exposes himself to potential
delays, rework and claims. The legal implications of the
change are of major importance. The shipbuilder contends
that he is trying to satisfy the government's requirements
and the Navy argues that the change was not officially
initiated.
Given all of the above, it isn't clear that private
shipbuilders have conducted themselves in a manner so as to
contingency price the contract to insure themselves against
undue risks. The reasons are not clear why they haven't
taken action to include protective clauses in contracts.
Neither is it certain that the inclusion of a contengency
clause in a contract would improve the contractor's
94

performance nor that it would actually reduce the number and
dollar value of claims that have been filed against the Navy
in the recent past. What is apparent is that the industry,
with few exceptions (e.g. Bethlehem), has considered the risks
associated with all of the items discussed above to be less
desirable than the alternative of possibly going out of
business for lack of work, especially when the shipbuilding
industry is so heavily dependent on government contracts.
Solutions to the problem (s) are not readily apparent
to the writers; however, it is clear that both parties must
become more responsive to these problems if they expect to
come up with solutions that are equitable to both. Otherwise,
the claims problem will only continue to grow.
As of December 19 73, claims still remaining to be
settled (amount for unresolved claims and the amount of
claims on appeal to the Armed Services Board of Contract.
Appeals (ASBCA) ) totaled nearly $1.3 billion [41, p.2]. The
total amount for December 1967 was about $66 million [41, p.2]
A comparison between outstanding claims over $5
million as reported by the Navy for two different periods is
shown below [42, p. 1654]:











Does not include claims that have been referred to the











The difference between the total volume of claims
outstanding for the periods listed is attributable to the
settlement of some claims but is due primarily to Litton'
s
referral of three claims totaling $162 million to the ASBCA.
The evident trend in Navy ship construction with
respect to both contract award and administration of claims
would indicate that, while the government is disenchanted
with contractors, so also is the converse true.
In February 19 74, an executive from Todd Shipyards
Corporation advised Naval Ship Systems Command in a personal
letter, the reasons for the priv£ite shipbuilding industry's
declining interest in Navy new construction programs. He
stated that not only do Navy contracts resu.lt in greater
contractor risk with only minimal opportunities for profit,
but the constricting clauses nuide it difficult to make major
capital improvements or satisfy corporate stockholders,
Consequently,, private contractors were turning more and mo3
to the commercial shipbuilding market . However, it is pos-
sible that the pendulum will begin swinging in the opposite
direction, gaining momentum as the economic condition of t]
nation's industries worsens.
While much effort and money has been expended over
the last few years attempting to determine the causes of the
large shipbuilding claims, it is apparent that such an answe:
has not yet been found.
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F. COMPETITION IN THE U.S. SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY
Since the end of WW II. there has been unused capacity
in shipbuilding in the U.S. in both private and public
sectors [16, p.vii] . Primarily because of this overcapacity,
but due also to the recent increased demand in ships, there
has occurred intensive rivalry within the nation's ship-
building and repair industry [23, p. 17].
Much of the recent demand for ships has been concentrated
in large and medium-size tankers, 200,000 dwt and 90,000 dwt
respectively, 3 8,0 00 dwt cargo vessels and in large LNG's
[52, p. 16]. The majority of these vessels are within the
productive capability of most domestic shipyards, or will be
whenever they complete their expansion programs.
In June 1974 , the Maritime Administration published a re-
port to Congress on the relative costs of shipbuilding in the
various coastal districts of the nation. The report brought
out that geographical cost differentials exist among tl
various regions of the country (see Chapter III, Section C)
,
however, they concluded that the cost differences did not
play a significant role in the awarding of contracts. For
example, the West Coast, which has the highest costs of any
district, on January 1, 19 74, had 3 3 ships under contract,
one less than the East Coast, the region which consistently
builds the majority of vessels in this country [50, pp. 15-17]
Based on this information, MarAd concluded that there now
exists shipyard competition on an equalized basis as far as
costs are concerned (i.e. geographical cost differentials do
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not have an overriding influence in the shipyard selection
process)
.
Table 27 summarizes information pertaining to contracts
that were awarded in FY19 7 3 for which CDS had been approved,
TABLE 2 7













Avondale LNG 3 189, 510* $ 309, 060 ,000
Bath Ro/Ro 1 17, 859 35, o o n3 J / ,647
Bethlehem Tanker 2 530, 000 16 2, 9.18 ,400
GD (Quincy) LNG 3 190
1
80 0* 268, 725 ,000
National Steel Tanker 4 35C, 800 112, 760 ,000
Newport News LNG 3 190,,380* 29 7, 652 ,500
Seatrain Tanker 1
17
225, 000 70, 60 3 ,5 00
TOTAL 1,702. 349 $1,257, 57
,
o ;
(1) Total contract cost including CDS and National Defense
Features, but excluding engineering and change orders.
*125,000 cubic meter liquefied natural gas carriers.
Source: MarAd [50, pp. 6-7)
Table 2 8 contains summary information regarding deliveries
from U.Sc shipyards during FY1973.
The information contained in Tables 27 and 2 8 is con-




DELIVERIES FROM U.S. SHIPYARDS DURING FY19 73





GD (Quincy) Seabee 2








Source : Ma rAd [50, p . 9 ]
The information presented in Table 29 would have beers
more meaningful if additional data had been available. How-
ever, the information listed lends support to MarAd's conclu-
sion that U.S. shipyards are now competing on an equal basis,
In contrast, only one procurement for a new naval ship
program was awarded in 19 73, the lead ship contract for the
patrol frigate (FF) [23, p. 27], U.S. private shipyards
delivered eight naval vessels in 1973 (calendar) consisting
of one replenishment oiler (AOR) , two nuclear powered attack





SHIPS CONTRACTED FOR AND DELIVERED FROM






Avondale 4 189,510 $309,060,000
Bath 3 17,859 35,337,647
Bethlehem 6 530,000 162,918,400
GD (Quincy) 5 190,800 268,725,000
Ingalls (Litton) 5 (3) (3)
National Steel 4 358,800 112,760,000
Newport News 3 190,380 297,652,500
Seatrain 1 225,000 70,603,500
Sun 3 (3) (3)
(1) Tonnage for ships delivered is not. incluc
(2) Costs for ships delivered are not included
(3) Data unavailable
Source : MarAd [50, p . 6- 7 , 9]
Table prepared by L.E. Garcia
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There were 56 naval vessels under construction or con-
tract in private yards as of December 31, 1973 [23, p. 31].
Most of the naval ship construction today is concentrated in
three private shipyards, namely, Newport News, Ingalls
(Litton) and General Dynamics (Electric Boat) . All surface
nuclear powered vessels are currently under construction or
contract at Newport News, whereas most nuclear powered sub-
marines, including Trident, are undergoing construction or
are under contract at Electric Boat. Electric Boat is the
only major U.S. shipyard that is entirely involved with
naval construction. Litton is the sole contractor of the
DD-963 class destroyer.
G. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (R&D) /DESIGN
In the United States, ship research is carried out both
by the government, through MarAd, and by the Society of
Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, which is largely sup-
ported by the shipping and shipbuilding industries. The Navy
conducts a large research program, however there is little
opportunity for the shipbuilding industry to benefit from
Navy technology because most military developments haven't
been applicable to maritime use [32, p. 142]. For example,
unofficial Navy Department estimates (1973) indicate that
only about 1-2% of the Navy's annual R&D budget of $2.5
billion is utilized in Navy R&D projects that might be of
any benefit to the shipbuilding industry [32, p. 142].
Individual yards carry out their own research, but there
appears to be little interchange of information among the
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different shipyards. This situation may well result from
the intensive rivalry among U.S. yards, or from a fear of
becoming involved in antitrust law suits. J. T. Gilbride
and J. J. Henry have stated that shipbuilding over-capacity
and "short sighted U.S. Government policies" have been
detrimental to U.S. shipyard R&D efforts [16, p.vii].
The amounts spent on R&D by progressive U.S. shipyards
is seldom more than about -r% of sales, a level which compares
unfavorably with expenditures in other industries which
average between 1-2% of sales [2, p. 96]. This may only be a
reflection of the general economic weakness of the industry
than to any other reason.
MarAd 's primary R&D objective is to develop new tech-
nology that will increase shipyard productivity to a level
which will enable the American merchant fleet to be competi-
tive with fleets of other nations [44, p. 13]. In search of
new construction techniques , MarAd and the shipyards are
participating on a cost-sharing basis, 85% government, 15%
shipbuilders, in the R&D program [39, p. 84].
An effective R&D program requires a continuing active
participation by everyone: MarAd, Navy and the maritime
industry. Single, one time studies may solve particular
problems but they will not produce the information that is
essential for achieving the productivity that is desired.
Most merchant ships have been designed in recent years
by about six major naval architectural firms [16, p. 16], In
the past, vessels were "custom designed" by these firms to
10 2

meet the owners' requirements yet be capable of being con-
structed in most major yards. Once the contract had been
awarded, the yard's design team would then prepare working
plans retaining the basic design but deviating slightly to
adapt their own construction practices. Today, the ship
design process is undergoing a change in that shipyards are
now working closely with naval architecture firms in the
preparation of the final design. In addition to promoting
a closer relationship between the two organizations, it also
provides an opportunity for the shipyards to benefit from
the expertise of the architects who are often thought to be
the most creative of the shipbuilding professions [16, p. 17].
H. SPECULATIVE CONGLOMERATE BEHAVIOR
In the decade of the 1960 's, there was a wave of diversi-
fying corporate acquisitions by firms referred to as "con-
glomerates." These firms have been characterized as companii
whose diversification, either internal or external, involves
products whose engineering , design, production and marketing
requirements only slightly overlap. The impact of these
diversified acquisitions on the economic structure of the U.S.
has been a highly controversial issue, particularly with
respect to their anti-trust implications. Theories on the
behavior of the conglomerate enterprise have been numerous,
but supported with little or no empirical evidence. It is
the purpose of this study to produce some of the more common-
ly accepted theories of conglomerate motivation and behavior
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and possibly obtain some insight into conglomerate behavior




The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) publishes periodic
reports of mergers and acquisitions by classification type.
Conglomerate acquisitions are basically defined in two ways:
first, the broad definition of a conglomerate merger includes
those acquisitions which extend the acquiring firm's opera-
tions beyond its present product or geographical markets.
The second and more restrictive definition includes only
acquisitions where the two companies have neither a buyer-
seller relationship nor a functional relationship in manu-
facturing or distribution [17, p. 7-11].
Utilizing the broad definition of conglomerate acqui-
sition, from the mid-1950 ! s to 1970 the trend in diversify:!.
acquisitions rose from 52.6% to 84% of large acquisitions in
mining and manufacturing ($10 million or more) . Within the
narrower definition of the FTC (neither product nor market
extension) , conglomerate acquisitions rose from 12% of all
major acquisitions in 1952-1955 to 40% in 1970 [17, p. 11].
For purposes of this study, the narrower definition of con-
glomerate acquisition will be used.
2 Conglomerate Theory
a. Reasons for Conglomeration
The sudden increase in conglomerate acquisitions
appears to have been attributed to two primary reasons.
First, the rising threat of antitrust action for horizontal
10 4

and vertical mergers and secondly, financial emphasis on the
price-earnings multiple [4, p. 49]. Other suggested reasons
have been; the altruistic urge to help a depressed company
recover, recognition of hyperdepressed investment opportuni-
ties, and managerial entrepreneurship.
There has also been an analogy proposed between
institutionalized investors and conglomerated corporations.
While investors were purchasing portfolio diversification
through mutual funds, the conglomerates were acquiring a
"portfolio" of diversification through acquisitions [26,
p. 908]. Thus, the large conglomerates were able to absorb




A study of 2 8 conglomerate corporations by Lynch
in 19 71 concluded that there were explicitly established and
communicated objectives in terms of per-share perfcrasne- .
The successful conglomerate was considered to be mainly
interested in motivating and assisting a subsidiary to better
manage itself, shielding it from the external environment,
helloing to provide the necessary resources for improved per-
formance and providing a management philosophy of decentral-
ized authority and responsibility [15, p. 285].
The life-cycle of a conglomerate seems to divide
naturally in two stages. During the early stage, the top
management of a conglomerate seems to be primarily financially
oriented. This early period has been identified as the
development phase, where the firm is financially vice
10 3

product-oriented and its primary objective is rapid growth
of earnings. The second phase in the life-cycle occurs as
the conglomerate enters maturity and the top management
becomes more attentive to product lines with less emphasis
on acquisitions [14, p. 61].
c. Risk Aversion
The proposition that diversification reduces
risk has been widely upheld in conglomerate theory. If a
conglomerate should pursue predatory pricing in competition
with a firm which is not diversified, there is less overall
risk to the conglomerate in the event of failure than to the
firm which could lose everything. Risk aversion in large
firms is a supportable argument and if it is actually
practiced in an industry, the conglomerate would be much
more likely than a non-diversified firm to begin price-
cutting. (There is no empirical evidence that this is what
happens.) A conglomerate may also enter into some markets
which are considered too great a risk to other smaller firms
due to the amount of capital required. The conglomerate may
be in a bettor position to assume risk, for in the event of
faiiure. there could still be other subsidiaries to offset
the loss without serious consequence:; to the corporation.
3 . Sources of Economic Performance
The following lists indicate the prime factors which




a. Superior Performance [5, p. 21]
(1) Better rationing of capital
(2) Better mobilization of internally-sourced
capital
(3) Lower cost of capital
(4) Better allocation of human resources
(5) Better succession
(6) Full utilization of tax shields
(7) Greater managerial accountability
(8) Better financial controls
(9) Scale economies of staff services
(10) Greater cross-industry mobility
(11) Ability to obtain synergistic results both
operationally and financially
b. Inferior Performance [13, p. 18]
(1) Distortion of Corporate goals
(2) Non-economic product mix
(3) Limited cross-industry trsmsferability of
man age r i a 1 abi 1 i t
y
(4) Imperfect profit center decentralization
(5) Excessive size
(6) Excessive preoccuparcion with growth
(7) Top-heavy capital structure
(8) Impaired managerial incentives
4 . Antitrust Elements of Conglomerate Behavior
A number of objections to conglomerate acquisitions
have been raised. These objections essentially consist of
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conglomerate practices which conflict with antitrust laws in
four basic areas.
a. Cross-Product Subsidization
This conduct refers to the various types of pre-
datory behavior potential of a firm if it uses funds earned
in one subsidiary's product line to support activities of
other less profitable subsidiary's product lines.
b. Reciprocity in Buying and Selling
Reciprocity refers to the possible pressures that
a large conglomerate can exert on other firms for reciprocal
buy-sell agreements due to the conglomerated broad market
coverage.
c. Non-Price Competition
This refers to possible effects of conglomerate
mergers on the level of concentration of the industries they
enter, i.e. through the use of large-scale advertising, etc.
d. Raising Barriers to Entry
It has been argued that through the ability to use
all of the aforementioned practices, a conglomerate can
enhance its share of a particular market and by so doir .
,
raise the barriers to entry into that industry.
5 . Reasons for Acqui si ticnns/Vulnerability of Firms
Several possible reasons for vulnerability to a take-
over are [5, pp. 21-22]:
a. Bad or complacent management
b. Excessive liquidity
c. Unused borrowing power
10 8

cL Excessive and unproductive plowback of earnings
e. Large depreciation write-offs resulting in low
earnings
f. Cash flow imbalance
g. Tax shields for either the acquiring or the
acquired company.
6 . Cong Iomerates and the U.S. Shipbuilding Industry
Most of the major U.S. shipyards are conglomerate
controlled. Using the restrictive definition of conglomerate
acquisitions, Table 30 lists the corporate control, date of
acquisition where applicable, and the writers ' judgement of
the type of acquisition classification.
TABLE 30
CORPORATE CONTROL OF MAJOR PRIVATE U.S. SHIPYARDS
Shipyard Control Classification Date
Avondal? Ogdcn Corp.
Bath Iron W. Bath Industries
Bethlehem Bethlehem Steel
Electric Boat General Dynamics





Newport News Tenneco Inc.



















Source: Commission on American Shipbuilding [32, pp. 367-4 84]
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a. Criticism of Conglomerate Controlled Shipyards
Conglomerate control has been sharply criticized
in the shipbuilding industry, especially by Admiral Rickover.
These criticisms are in four basic areas [34, pp. 84-85]:
(1) Profit. Achievement of a profit is the
driving force for a conglomerate's division. As a result,
shipbuilding has become a "financial game."
(2) Management . Some private shipyards are run
by legal, financial and contract experts vice technical
managers. These men are proficient with public relations and
creative accounting, skilled at dealing with the government,
and are not interested in .ships per-se but only in making a
good profit.
(3) Unsupported C laims . Shipbuilde.rs sometime
submit factually unsupported claims which are assertions,
judgements end allegations. Some companies also retain
specialized law firms to help prepare and prosecute claims
against the government. These firms are usually paid
according to the amount of money they obtain from the govern-
ment in each case,
(4) P rogress ve rp aymen ts . At times, shipbuilders
have obtained progress overpayments which were not due and
were, in effect, receiving interest free loans from the
government.
Once again, much of the criticisms of con-





b. Speculative Issues of Conglomerate Control
A close look at conglomerate control and the
general behavior of affiliated shipyards is beyond the scope
of this study but is suggested for further study. An attempt
will be made to hypothesize some of the elements of shipyard
conglomerate behavior with respect to the conglomerate struc-
ture and behavioral theories previously mentioned.
(-*-) Power. Due to the inherent diversity and
pure financial position of large conglomerates, their top
management would tend to have vast resources of influence
and associations in the business and political world. For
example, during testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on
Priorities and Economy in Government,. FY1973, Mr. Roy Ash was
sharply criticized for his role in the LHA shipbuilding claim
negotiations with the Navy. (It had already been announced
that he would leave Litton to assume the duties as the
director of the Office of Management and Budget (CMB) [43,
p. 1916] . )
(2) Claims . The fact that the conglomerates can
afford and normally keep a full-time staff of lawyers would
tend to indicate a stronger emphasis by the firm on legal
matters. Together with a driving motive for earnings f it is
possi.ble that a shipbuilding conglomerate could concentrate
its legal resources on the low-profit shipbuilding subsidiary




(3) Acquisi tions. A brief look at the U.S. ship-
yard acquisitions by conglomerates reveals that three yards
were acquired in 1959, a recessionary period, where poor
financial outlooks for the shipytirds (Avondale, Lockheed,
National Steel) may have played a major role in the decision
to merge. /additionally, three other shipyards (Newport News
,
Ingalls, Quincy) were known to have been in some financial
difficulties at the time of their acquisition.
(4) Capital Investment. It is worthy of note
that Litton was the first of the major shipyard owners in
many years to construct a new shipbuilding facility from the
ground up. Although there were many undertones of financial
and political manipulations associated with the venture, it
is doubtful if a non-conglomerate would have undertaken the
risks involved,
(5) Maturity. To date, no major U.S, shipyard
has chcinged owners since being acquired by a conglomerate.
(The Quincy yard changed ownership from a large corporation
(Bethlehem Steel) to a conglomerate (General Dynamics) in
1963.)
An analysis of shipyard eicquisitions and
associated conglomerate behavior before and after the acqui-
sitions may prove beneficial in order to determine if there
is any correlation with conglomerate maturity and is suggested
for further study.
(6) Pooling of Interest. Most major shipyard
conglomerates use the pooling-of-interest method of accounting
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whereby in a merger the asset values of the acquired company
are "pooled" with the conglomerate assets at book value.
This method provides an advantage in that asset values sub-
ject to write-off against income are minimized, and future
earnings performance is improved [12, p. 645].
c. Case Study
Appendix B of this thesis contains a case study
of the acquisition of Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock





In economic terms,, performance is an appraisal of the
results of an industry's behavior as compared with some
"standard" which has been determined by considering -the
optimum utilization of resources to achieve the nation's
goals. In general , economic goals are efficiency, full
employment, progressiveness/innojzativeness and equitable
distribution of real output among the elements of an industry
[1, pp. 9 3-9 4]
.
Once again, the threads of continuity from structure-to-
conduct-- to- performance are clouded in the U.S. shipbuilding
industry due to the varying roles played by the government,
shipbuilders and shippers. Quantifiable "standards" of
performance in the U.S. shipbuilding industry are few. Fre-
quently, subjectivity must be applied in order to provide
some means of assessing performance.
It is the intent of this chapter to assess performance
where standards exist or arc implied and to identify those
elements of the industry for which no quantifiable standards
are prevalent.
B. EVALUATION OF SHIPYARD PERFORMANCE
The U.S. shipbuilders' performance may be looked upon as
an appraisal of how that industry's behavior deviates from
the best possible goal attainable. Unfortunately, problems
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develop when one begins to compare results that have been
achieved against standards that have not been clearly defined
or universally accepted. It is also true that some industries
have not established standards by which to measure their per-
formance:. Such is the case in the shipbuilding industry.
This section v/ill investigate the industry's performance as
it relates to productivity, output and profitability.
1 Productivity
Productivity may be defined as a measure of how effec-
tively resources such as steel and machinery are converted
into ships, (i.e. a measure of the output of a process per
unit of input) . 7-iccording to the Commission on American
Shipbuilding (COAS) , the most p3:eferred method for measuring
output is the value-added method, which is "derived by sub-
tracting the total cost of materials (including materials,
supplies, fuel, electric energy, cost of resales and miscc.1 -
laneous receipts) from the value of shipments (including
resales) and other 2:eceipts and adjusting the resulting
amount by the net changes in finished products and work-in-
process in Ltories between the beginning and end of the
year" [2, p. 15], A detracting characteristic of the value-
added method is that the value of production is arrived at
indirectly through price which is subject to fluctuations
stemming from spurious expectations of supply and demand,
shipyard work and pricing policies.
The writers would like to point out that the former
Naval Ship Systems Command (NAVSHIPSYSCOM) considered the
15

use of the value-added concept as being an invalid method of
determining the cost of a production worker because of the
distortion that resulted from the different methods used by
naval and private shipyards in calculating overhead costs.
Private shipyards tend to include a greater amount of pur-
chased energy, services and materials in their overhead
accounts than do naval shipyards [54, p. 11].
Another method used to me£isure productivity is the
compensated gross registered tonnage (cgrt) concept. The use
of this method helps characterize to some extent the relative
sophistication of ships. The basis for this system is cargo
vessels of 5000 dwt and over which have been assigned coef-
ficients of 1.00. Other ships are assigned coefficients
according to type and relative complexities of construction.
The cgrt is determined by multiplying the gross registered
tonnage (grt) by the coefficient for that particular type of
ship. The table presented below lists the compensated
tonnage coefficients by type of ship [31, p. 36].
a. Flowrate
Lester B. Knight & Associates, Inc. de 1< id a
flowrate index to determine the utilization of capacity 4
the shipbuilding industry. The index is based on the rela-
tionship between the tonnage of ships under construction at
the beginning of the year and the total volume of new con-
struction completed at the end of the year. The significance
of this index is that it measures the turnover of the









Under 5,000 d*l 1.60






Under 30,000 dwt 0.65
30,000 - 50,000 dwt 0.50
50,000 - £0,000 d,vt 0.45
80,000 - 160,000 dwt 0.40
160,000 - 250,000 dwt 0.35
250,000 dwt and over 0.30
Multiple purpose (all sizes) 0.80
Bulk earners (including ore/oil)
Under 30,000 dwt 0.G0
30,000 - 50,000 dwt O.50
50,000 - 100,000 dwt 0.15
Over 1 (.0,000 dwt 0.40
Refrigerated cargo 2.00
Fish factory shi| s 2.00
Gas carriers and chemical tankers (including LNG) 2.1-0
Passenger ships 3.00
Ferry boats 2.00
Fishing vessels and miscellaneous ve?:?ls 1.50
Source: Shipbuilders Council of America,
COAS [31, p. 36)
200 means that the total volume produced is about twice the
tonnage that is under construction at any one time. T ble 3 2
shows the flowrate for a three year period (1968-1970 [32,
p. 71]
.
The writers would like to point out that there is
a discrepancy between the data listed in the COAS report and
the Shipbuilders Council of America (SCA) 1973 Annual Report.






1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
grt cgrt grt cgrt grt cgrt
Under
Construction 507.90 584.09 710.72 625.43 736.76 707.29
Delivered 367.62 422.76 463.68 408.04 374.91 359.92
* 72 72 65 65 51 51
*
, . _ , Deliveries during yearFlowrate Index: ~ = ~~ r x 10Tonnage under construction at
the beginning of the year
Source: Commission on American Shipbuilding [32, p.71] #
Lester B. Knight &. Associates, Inc., Lloyd's
Register of Shipping
the beginning of each of the years listed in Table 32, which
was obtained from the COAS report, is less than the tonnage
under construction for ships 1,000 grt and larger that is
listed in the SCA 1973 Annual Report (page 30). It isn't
possible to account for this discn cy with the data that
is available, however, this is an area that requires further
attention.
The relatively low flowrate figures are accounted
for, in part, by the highly sophisticated products that are
manufactured. Low flowrates , however, can also signify low
efficiency. That is, only a small portion of the total
tonnage under construction at the beginning of the year has




The eighteen industries listed below were analyzed
in an attempt to gather data for determining labor produc-
tivity. Table 3 3 contains a time series of output per man-
hour from .1.958 through 1971 for the industries listed [32,
p. 1169], During this fourteen-year period, the shipbuilding
and repairing industry has increased its labor productivity
by 32%. Other industries have shown wider ranges, but in
several cases greater overall increases than shipbuilding.
The labor intensiveness of the shipbuilding industry is
reflected in the low productivity figures. The values are
significantly higher for those industries recognized as using
mass production techniques (e.g. electric lamps, tires and
tubes, motor vehicles).
KEY TO INDUSTRIES TABULATED
1. Shipbuilding and Repairing
2. Aircraft
3. Aircraft Engine & Parts
4. Blast Furnaces S Steel Mills
5. Electric Lamps
6. Locomotive & Parts
7. Machine Tools
8. Motor Vehicles & Parts
10. Saw Mills & Planing Mills
11. Steel Pipe & Tube
14. Truck Trailers
15. Steam Engines, Turbines & Gen. Sets
16. Weaving Mills, Cotton
New items:
17. Railroad Equipment
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Table 3 4 is a summary of productivity measures
achieved by the U.S. shipbuilding industry during the period





Cgrt per Cgrt per Labor and Capital
Employee Labor Dolla rs Capi tal Dollars (Input (Dollars)
USA 41 - 51 .006 -.008 .022 -.043 .005 -.007
Source: Commission on American Shipbuilding [32, p. 130].
c. Discussion
The high levels achieved in American productivity
has been the result of capital investment in .labor saving
installations. Unfortunately,, business volume for the U.S.
shipbuilding industry did not justify capital investment to
increase productivity output. It was only within the last
few years that shipyards '
.
"
;"i to modernize and e: ai ' due
primarily to the increased ship demand generated by the 19 70
Act.
Admiral Rickover, testifying before Congress,
cites several examples of poor performance by shipyards
resulting in lower productivity. For example, poor manage-
ment, excessive use of overtime, idleness and loafing, and
excessive numbers of employees [33, p. 176- 180].
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It is a hypothesis of the writers that the large
investments made by private shipyards within the last few
years to modernize and expand their facilities is due
primarily to the increased ship demand generated by the 19 70
Act.
2 . Output
While launchings have been used as a measure of out-
put, it is considered more realistic to base output on
tonnage of ships actually completed. Therefore, we shall
continue to use the cgrt (described above) as the principal
measure of output.
a. Tonnage/Number of Ships
The data contained in Table 35 indicates that
during the period 1367 to 1971, the Dnited States produced
only 1.55% of the tonnage and 1.63% of the ships constructed
throughout the world [32, p. 46].
TABLE 35






West Germany 6 93 10.12
Great Britain 5.45 575
Norway 3.62 3 62
France 3 62 2 36
Spain 3.32 4 35
Denmark 3 15 1.78
Italy 2.64 217
Netherlands 2 20 3 12
Yugoslavia 2 10 1-94
U.S.S.R. 1.62 613
United States 1 55 J.63
Poland 1.20 2.94
Sour ce : COAS [ 3 2 , p . 4 6 J
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Table 36 contains data summarizing the total
number of vessels, and aggregate tonnage, constructed between
1965-1973 [23, p. 28]
.
TABLE 3 6
U.S. VESSELS DELIVERED (1965--1973)
No
.
of Ships Tonnage (1,rOOO)
Naval
18
Merchant Naval (LDT) Merchant (GRT)
1965 16 122 180
1966 13 13 74 161
1967 21 13 109 163
196 8 16 24 138 329
1969 31 22 160 416
1970 3 2 13 166 370
1971 33 14 14 7 4 7
19 7 2 21 19 95 491
1973 8 34 33 887
1
LDT (Light Displacement Ton)
Source: Shipbuilders Council of America [23, p. 2 8].
Delivery record information on vessels scheduled
to be delivered between February 19 70 and December 1972 is
contained in Table 37 [32, p. 740].
b. Discussion
Opportunity cost becomes an important factor when
delays or early deliveries occur. Late delivery, whether it




U.S. VE SSEL DELIVERY PECORD
2-1-70 to 12-31-72 (Schedule)
On Basis of Original Contract Dales:
Numbe r of Ships Delivered
Early
On time
1 - 3 months late 2
4 - 6 months late 1
7 - 9 months late 10
10-12 months late 4
13 - 18 months late 6
19-24 months late 3
Over 24 months late
Jl'pes of Sh ips Delivered
LASH Vessels 11
Cargo 8
Sea Barge Clipper 3
Conlaincr Ship 4
On Basis of Revised Contract Dates:
Nuinber o f S
i
; ips Deiiverec i
More than 2 months early
1 - 2 months early 8
On time 2
1 - 3 months late 7
4 - 6 months late 4
7 - 9 months late 1
10-12 months late 1
13-18 months late 3
More than 18 months late
Source: Maritime Administration, Shipbuilding
Progress Report ; September 30, 19 72;
Commission on American Shipbuilding [32,
p. 740]
.
capacity, can greatly affect the actual cost of a shj Co.
tractual clauses normally protect one against income losses
To this loss of revenue, buyers must add the interest costs
on progress payments made on the ship. Hence, shipyards
which have a reputation for delivering on time are more apt
to be in demand by buyers.
3 • Profitability
Profitability of U.S. shipyards is difficult to
document. Most of the major yards are now owned by large
.12 4

conglomerates and their individual profit performance is not
available. However, six companies provided financial data to
the COAS with the provisions that they not be identified and
that their data be consolidated so as to prevent anyone from
determining its origin, The information presented below is
based on this consolidated information,
a. Financial Performance
Table 38 contains cumulative balance sheet data
for the period 1967-1973. [32, p. 135]. Included are two
financial ratios - net working capital and current ratio.
It is interesting to note that long-term debt degan to
increase considerably at approximately the same time ship-
yards were beginning to modernize and expand. This is borne
cut by the fact that the percentage of total assets repre-
sented by plant, property, and equipment has grown steadily,
from 33% to 41%.
Summarized in Table 39 is data on revenues and
income [32, p. 136]. While total revenues in 1971 have
increased since 1967, net income has decreased. Other sig-
nificant it: as are bhat on;: dollar in assets generat< s
approximately two dollars in revenue, net income after taxes
computed annually, is Jess than 2% of revenues except for
19 67, and the return on assets employed computed annually,
is generally 3-4%.
Table 4 contains data on profits as a percentage
of sales for the same period [32, p. 136].

TABLE 3 8
SUMMARY BALANCE SHEET (1967-1971)
(1,000)
J 971 1970 1969 1968 1967
ASSETS
CURRENT ASSETS




$275,161 ',282,638 $334,9(4 £309,989 $265,748
176,583 169,197 162,581 150.135 132.238
27,366 11,580 8J_09_ 9,126 7,337
$479,110 $463,415 $505,8.'4 $469,250 $40S,323
LIABILITIES AM) CAPITAL*
CURRENT LIABILITIES
FUNDED DEBT • DUE BEYOND ONE YEAR*
OTHER LONG-TERM LIABILITIES*
CAPITAL (STOCKHOLDERS' EQUITY OR
DIVISIONAL OR SUBSIDIARY RENTAL)*
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND CAPITAL
$169,344 $184,047 $224,8 l 'l $189,839 5150,167
58,888 44,784 56,913 57,695 33,150
9.9i8 10,446 8,331 5,711 4,140
,240,960 224,138 215,639 216,005 .217,866.
$479,110 S463.415 $508,854 $469,250 $405,323
FINANCIAL RATIOS 'BALANCES
NET WORKING CAPITAL




5105,817 S 93,591 $110,073 $120,150 5315,58!
1.625 1.53% 1.49? 1.63% 1.77%
Because several cf the r< bing entities function as
divisions or subsidiaries of large corporations, certaj
balance sheet (liabilities and capital) accounts will :.
reflect accurate balances.




SUMMARY INCOME STATEMENT, FINANCIAL RATIOS AND INDICES
(1967-1971)
!97! 1970 1969 1968 1967
REVENUE
(Some Revenue Other Than From
Shipbuilding is Included)
NET OPERATING INCOME (LOSS)
Less: Exlraordinaiy Items, Interest, and
Other Nonoperatmg Income or
Expenses*
NET INCOME BEFORE TAXES (LOSS)
NET INCOME AFTER TAXES (LOSS)8
NET INCOME (AFTER TAXES) AS A
PERCENT OF REVENUE
RATIO OF ASSET TURNOVER REVENUE
TO ASSETS EMPLOYED
PERCENT RETURN (AFTER TAXES) ON
ASSETS EMPLOYED
$973,607 $1,037,770 $945,S8i $712,040 $844,399
38,266 15,833 33,546 30,013 39.975
35,423 9,754 28,154 27.6SS 38,054



















*Estimated / as several reporting entities are division op
tions with no federal income tax computed for the division;
in addition no interest expense is carried at this level,
**Reported by all firms except one; and in this case, an
estimate was used.
Source: Commission on American Shipbuilding [32, p. 106].
$479,1 !0
156,213








$635,328 $ 607,180 $642,J90 $597,102 5523,839
169,341 184,047 224,891 180,839 150,167




NET INCOME (AFTER TAXES) AS A
PERCENT OF REVENUE (1967-1971)
1967 196JL 1969 1970 19 71
2.69% 1.9 8% 1.35% 0.52% 1.84%
b. Discussion
Analyses of the limited financial data which were
made available by the six cooperating yards indicated that
the shipbuilding business hasn't been very profitable.
The Department of Defense currently collects
profit data by contract which reflect profit-on-cost rather
than profit-on-capital [43, p. 2741]. It would seem that
determining the contractor's profit-on-capital would be more
meaningful and of greater relevance than the information that
is available under the present system.
Based on the hearings before the Subcommittee on
Priorities and Economy in Government of the Joint Economic
Committee, conducted November 1373,- it is a ent t3 at ]
has been slcv T to change the reporting system to .. : lect.
profit-on-capital. This is borne out by Senator Proximire's
comments pertaining to his having requested this type of
information since 1968, without success [42, p. 2201]. DOD '
s
response is that they don't have all the necessary data.
12 8

C. IMPACT OF CLAIMS ON PERFORMANCE
] . Actual
Substantive evidence as to the effect claims have had
on both the government's (Navy/MarAd) and the shipbuilding
industry's performance is rather difficult to document. How-
ever, several policy changes have resulted as a consequence
of the large number of claims that have been filed against
the Navy within the last few years. For example, the Navy
has established a board of line officer admirals "to pass
judgment on large claims" [33, pJ62]„ Assignment to the
board is in addition to the admirals primary duties.
The Navy claim identification clauses were imple-
mented as a result of " constructive changes" made possible
by court and board decisions which effectively allowed a
contractor not to comply with seme of trie basic contract
requirements. The main purpose of the identification
clauses is to regain for the government some of the control
of the change process by surfacing the problem as close to
the event that caused it, and settling it while all relevant
data is readily available.
Another impact of the claims problem is thai, the
Navy's image has suffered by the fact that been Congress and
the public are losing confidence in the Navy's ability to
perform satisfactorily in the business environment.
7vs has been mentioned previously in this report (see
Chapter IV, Section E)
,
presidents of major shipyards have
frequently voiced disenchantment in their relationships with
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the Navy. They have gone so far as to imply a preference
for non-Navy contracts.
Recent indications (e.g. Patrol Frigate) suggest
that more cost plus type contracts will be awarded in the
future vice fixed type. Also, the Navy has publicly stated
that it will attempt to reduce the number of changes incor-
porated into new construction vessels, hoping to minimize
the claims problem. This policy should result in better
thought-out and written specifications, an area that was in
need of top level attention.
2 • Speculative
As a basic measure of performance, claims could be
looked upon as inefficiency on the part of either the con-
tractor or the acquisition/contract administration process
of the purchaser. Poor performance on the part of the con-
tractor or "buying in" on a contract at a bid which is
unrealistically low could possibly entice the contractor to
recover his excess costs, and even some profit, through the
claims process. Whether this practice of claims behavior
actually exists is speculative and without supporting data.
It was noted in Chapter IV, Section H, that the practice o:
retaining claims lawyers in Washington by the large ship-
building firms has been criticized by government represen-
tatives. Poor performance in government contracting has
been previously identified as a major source of claims. It
is the opinion of the writers that there is an element of
ineffective performance on the part of both parties in most
130

shipbuilding claims and that such claims reflect adversely on
the conduct of the parties during the given contract period.
Performance evaluation of a shipbuilding contractor
under risk and uncertainty, particularly during research find
development, appears to offer excellent potential for the
near future. The ability to identify risk and quantify uncer-
tainty through sophisticated statistical techniques is a
process just beginning to become widely accepted. By identi-
fying risk and assessing the levels of uncertainty when a
contractor undertakes a difficult project, performance may
actually become quantifiable and a "track record" established
Unfortunately, the major drawback in this area has been the
"uncertainty" of the initial assessment of uncertainty.
D. GOVERNMENT ROLE IN PERFORMANCE OF
THE U.S. SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY
1 . MarAd
As the primary agency for carrying out the policies
of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as ammended in 1970,
MeirAd has two basic goals according to the Assistant Secre-
tary of Commerce for Maritime Affairs:
a. To develop a fleet adequate to carry ex substan-
tial portion of U.S. trade; the pre gram goal of which is
a 17% U.S. flag vessel participation in U.S. foreign trade
by 19 82.
b. To develop a merchant marine capable of serving
as a military auxiliary in time of national emergency and




Through subsidy payments and administration of
financing arrangements, the MarAd has sought to achieve
these broad goals and also attempted to carry out the objec-
tive goal of the 19 70 ammendment to build -some 300 highly
productive merchant ships of advanced design over a 10 year
period.
As of June 30, 1974, the number of vessels ordered
under the 1970 ammendment amounted to 59 oceangoing ships
subsidized by MarAd. Of the 12 CDS contracts awarded in
FY1974, all were for tankers, three of which were rated at
390,770 dwt each [55, p. 78].
A program of 300 ships in 10 years calls for an
average of 30 ships per year and assuming a two year start-
up for the program (which is implied by MarAd) , 9 ships
should have been constructed by the end of FY1974. However,
based on available data, only 43 ships had been delivered as
of June 30, 1974 [48, p. 12] [49, p. 9] [50, p. 6] [55, p. 78].
Additionally, MarAd announced in 1973 that it had initiated
a formula for co] iputing the relative productivity of newer
large dwt vessels, as compared to those vessels considered in
the 1970 ammendment, in order to compensate for 1 he fewer
numbers of ships being produced. According to MarAd, appli-
cation of this formula to the ships produced under the 19 70
Ammendment resulted in a substantial excess in total dwt
over equivalent dwt of vessels originally considered under
the 1970 Ammendment [39, p. 7]. This action is not fully
understood, particularly in view of the recent substantial
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increase in dwt for tankers (VLCC and ULCC's). Although
capable of carrying much greater crude oil to the U.S.,
these tankers are of questionable value to the military in
time of war. Additionally, due to environmental restric-
tions and inadequate channel depths, there are still no
"superports" available in the U.S. to accept these large
tankers
.
Based on available data, the breakdown of ship types
ordered under the 19 70 Ammendment are listed in Table 41.
TABLE 41
NUMBER AMD TYPES OF SHIPS ORDERED
UNDER CDS, FY1971-1974
Total Tanker LNG LASH Container OBO Roll-on/off
1974 12 12
19 73 17 7 9 1
1972 21 16 2 3
1971 12 2 7 3
Source: MarAd [48, p. 1.1] [49, p. 8] [50, p.G] [55, p. 78] .
It must be noted that the number of ships listed in
the above table do not include those ships built without sub-
sidy. Adding these vessels to the total would amount to
roughly 110 vessels since the 19 70 Ammendment. Additionally,.
a total of 6 2 ships in Table 41 versus the 59 total previous-
ly reported probably reflects some cancellations although no
data was available on contract cancellations.
13 3

According to the Department of Commerce annual report
for FY1974, U.S. flag vessels carried 39.8 million tons of
cargo in calendar year 19 73. This tonnage represented only
6.4% of the nation's waterborne foreign trade movement [55,
p. 79]. Table 42 lists percentage of U.S. tonnage carried in
U.S. flag vessels since 1967. With the number of U.S.
import tonnage increasing in 19 73, it is still doubtful that
a goal of 17% in 19 82 will be realized without legislation
such as the Energy Transportation Security Act of 19 74 which
called for 20% of all U.S. oil imports be carried in U.S.
flag ships and was vetoed in December of 1974.
TABLE 4 2
U.S. FLAG CCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE
FOR CALENDAR YEARS 19 67-73
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Long Tons Carried in 20.5 25.0 19.1 25.2 2 4.4 2 7.6 39.8
U.S. Shiys (mi .11 ions)
Percentage of Foreign 5.3 6.0 4.5 5.3 5.3 5.3 6.4
Trade
Source: Depai client of Commerce [55, p. 81].
With respect to Mar/^d's second basic goal, to provide
a merchant marine capable of serving as a military auxiliary
in time of national emergency or war, no measurable standard
has been identified.. During hearings before the Congress in
April 1973, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Maritime
134

Affairs stated that he had no ten-year shipbuilding program,
per se, but that the MarAd had a one-year program for
building and had the necessary applications to support that
program [38, p. 85]. Further research to determine if, in
fact, a long-range merchant shipbuilding program for national
defense has since been established has been unsuccessful,
Such a program would require a joint effort, at least at the
Department of Defense/Department of Commerce level, and
fully supported by Congress. It is the opinion of these
writers that until a specific long-range shipbuilding program
is established for both types and quantities of merchant
vessels needed during national emergencies or war, the
second basic goal of MarAd will remain ambiguous and valuable
tax dollars may be wasted on subsidies for ships which may
be either unsuitable or in excess of requirements to meet
the go a 1
.
2 . U.S. Navy
Attempts to evaluate the performance of the Navy in
the U.S. shipbuilding industry have been unquantifiable
.
goals of tie Navy shipbu Iding program are quite basic: To
acquire ships in sufficient quantity, at a minimum cost, tj -
ly, and meeting minimum specifications.
No quantifiable basis for performance evaluation of
these goals appears to exist. However, a comprehensive
analysis of cost escalation in Navy shipbuilding contracts
does offer some potential in this area, particularly if the
escalation is identifiable with its cause (s). During
13!

testimony before the Seapower Subcommittee in 1974, major
shipbuilders generally expressed dissatisfaction with the
Navy ship acquisition process, particularly with respect to
the audit and contract administration areas. Some ship-
builders even indicated a preference for merchant contracts
over Navy contracts due to the complexity of the Navy's
acquisition process, low profits and degree of involvement
by the Navy in the contractor's performance [22, p. 37] [9,
p. 82] .
The price of a naval ship is difficult to associate
with the benefits obtained therefrom. Determining the utility
of an aircraft carrier which costs one billion dollars is, at
best, a highly subjective process. It is quite understand-
able, that the Navy's performance in the shipbuilding
industry is best evaluated in time of war when the securj
;
cf the country is jeapordized. Unfortunately, in such a
crisis, the "cost" of a Navy vessel is insignificant cc ed
to the need for optimum performance.
3 . Congress
Congress plays a vital role in the U.S. ship]-.'.;:'..1 ding
industry as the principal legislative body. Again, no quanti-
fiable measure of performance for the Congress has been
readily identified. However, it is suggested that a detailed
study of the impact of congressional actions (such as appro-
priation reductions, new legislation, etc.) on Navy and MarAd
shipbuilding programs could provide a basis for performance
evaluation. In addition, it is apparent that any deviations
136

from the basic goals set forth in the Merchant Marine Act
of 1936, as airanended, are not only a reflection on the per-
formance of the industry, Navy and/or MarAd, but also on the
congressional oversight of these elements. It is noted that
the report of the Seapower Subcommittee's recent four month
hearing contained the following recommendations:
a. Require a timetable from appropriate agencies
for planned improvement programs in U.S. shipyards.
b. Reinstitute some new ship construction in naval
shipyards
.
c. Conduct congressional review of overhaul, repair
and maintenance programs on a continuing basis,
d. Include inflation as a separate item in future
shipbuilding contracts, with the government prepared to bear
increased cost attributable to unanticipated inflation .
e. Develop a new system to handle contractual claims
f. Termi: ite open-ended, cost plus contracts for
Navy ships .
g. Remove civilian hiring limitations in public
shipyards
„
h. Establish training programs leading directly bo
shipyard employment and conduct a further review on the
status of U.S. shipyards in early FY1976.
Additionally, the report emphasized the need for a
firm, five-year shipbuilding program that would enable the
Navy to enter the 1980 's with a minimum of 600 active ships
with a construction target of 35 ships per year [3, p.l].
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These recommendations indicate a considerable effort by
Congress to identify and attempt to rectify problems in the
shipbuilding industry, many of which have been addressed
earlier in this study. Although a copy of the subcommittee's
full report is not available at the time of this writing,
the report will go to the full House Armed Services Committee
for consideration. It is felt that final action on the sub-
committee's excellent recommendations would provide a valu-




VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A review of the elements of structure, conduct and per-
formance in the U.S. shipbuilding industry which have been
presented in this study have led the writers to the following
conclusions:
1. The issue of mobilization appears to be the primary
reason for the depth of government involvement in the industry
However, the concept of mobilization base today does not seem
to be well defined and there also appears to be a lack of
coordination and agreement between the Navy and MarAd on this
issue. The data presented suggests an apparent lack of a
national objective for the shipbuilding industry in terms of
long-range shipbuilding programs and the shipyard capacities
required to support a mobilization effort.
Based on the current status of the industry, it is
not clear to the writers whether a restructuring would be in
the best interests of the nation. However, once a mobiliza-
tion base requirement has been clearly defined the issue of
restructuring the industry may then be given serious con-
sideration. It is felt that a restructuring could possibly
range from nationalization of the U.S. shipbuilding industry
or increased government subsidization to far less involvement
by the federal government. In some instances, marginal ship-
builders may be allowed to either function as peripheral
firms, be absorbed by the industry or go out of business.
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Consideration of the elements discussed above and
other data presented has also led to the following additional
conclusions
2. As the capacity of the shipbuilding industry approa<
full utilization, the existing shipbuilding goals of the Navy
and MarAd could become conflicting to the extent that the two
agencies approach a rivalry for remaining capacity,
3. The U.S. shipbuilding industry can be considered to
resemble an oligopoly of shipbuilders during periods of low
demand. As capacity utilization approaches maximum in the
industry, rivalries weaken and may even disappear if ship
demands exceed capacity levels. In such instances, buyers
would place orders based more on shipyard capability , open
capacity and delivery estimates rather than price consider-
ations. This is particularly true in merchant vessel orde]
where construction subsidies would normally cover any
increased prices up to the statutory percentage limits .
Additionally, it is felt that the U.S. Navy may be
considered a monopsonist in certain rreas of the industry
when it is the only customer for a shipyard's output (] lec-
tric Boat) or the primary source of : ; shipyard's -
(Ingalls, Newport News). In such instances, these shipya:
may have a monopoly on certain Navy contracts and hence, a
bilateral monopoly would exist.
Although a monopolistic firm has a great deal of
potential market power, this power tends to be weakened by
government involvement and regulation, unstable demand condi-
tions and the countervailing power of the monopsonist.
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Bilateral monopolies may lead to intense power struggles by
both parties and a general decline in business relationships.
It is suggested that recent Navy problems with Newport News
and Litton are the result of a bilateral monopoly power
struggle
.
4. The U.S. shipbuilding and repair industry has not
established standards by which its achievements can be
measured (e.g. material and labor productivity, output).
Without industry recognized standards, it is difficult, at
best, to determine the level of performance achieved by the
different firms in the industry. Commonly established
standards would also provide a means for individual firms to
monitor their performance. Performance standards should have
been established while the COAS was conducting its study on
the shipbuilding and repair industry of the United States.
The inclusion of such standards would have enhanced the mean-
ing-fullness of the final report which they ' 1 3d.
5. Existing data does not support the hypothesis that
commercial shipbuilding contracts are more ] : fitable tha
Navy contract--. Shipbuilding executives fr >ntly remark
that profit margins on Navy contracts are 1 itisfactory
(i.e. too low). However, they have- been relit itant to provide
detailed financial data to support their statements or to
justify the assumption that commercial contracts are more
profitable. Neither is it clear that the large backlog of
merchant ships is due to increased profitability of commer-




factors such as the impetus provided by the 19 70 Act and an
increased demand for energy carriers, especially since the
recent oil embargo and the decision to proceed with the
construction of the Alaskan oil pipeline.
6. Skilled labor shortages and insufficient training
programs restrict: the capacity of most U.S. shipyards. It
is not felt that government assisted training programs for
shipyard skills would be an effective solution to this short-
age as long as it is possible to earn higher earnings for
similar skills in other industries. It is conceivable that
the shipbuilding labor wage rates could be increased above
those of competing industries through increased prices for
Navy ships and increased MarAd subsidies. Then, the ship-
yards could afford to provide better apprenticeship programs
with a greater probability of retaining its graduates in the
shipbuilding industry. Thus, the government could be con-
sidered to be indirectly supporting shipyard apprenticeship
training programs
.
7. The migratory habits of unemployed shipyard workers
specifically those that have been laid off, are not clearly
known. A recent example is what happened when the . Dston
Naval shipyard w; s closed. Senior naval officials expected
that several of the Boston shipyard workers would seek
similar posit ions in shipyards located further south. How-
ever, this exodus south failed to materialize.
8. Existing data does not clearly indicate that the
large backlog of ships under contract to private yards has
14 2

impacted unfavorably on the Navy shipbuilding program.
Delivery date slippages may be attributed more to a shortage
of adequately trained personnel and/or material. There
doesn't seem to be any evidence to suggest that either
personnel or material have been diverted from Navy to commer-
cial shipbuilding projects.
9. A comprehensive integrated R&D program among the
Navy, MarAd and industry does not seem to exist. Based en
available information, very little coordination in R&D pro-
jects or interchange of information takes place among these
organizations
.
10. The "grandfather clause" requirement of the current
law appears to have had an inhibiting influence on the parti-
cipation of U.S. oil companies in domestic ship construction.
Based primarily on the previous conclusions, the
following courses of action are recommended:
1, Major joint research should be undertaken by \
Office, of Preparedness, Department of Commerce and Department
of Dei m ;e to determine the mobilization requirements for
Navy and merchant ships by type and quantity and also i
time required to obtain these vessels.
Once these requirements have been determined, further
research should be conducted to determine the amount of
shipyard capacity required to support these requirements.
Additionally, the demand for ships should be analyzed to
determine if it is compatible with established requirements.
Where the demand for ships exceeds mobilization requirements,
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expansion of the industry is indicated. If the demand for
ships falls below minimum requirements, alternative plans
should be available such as building required ships under
full subsidy and laying them up for future mobilization call-
up or lease to private shippers.
2. Conduct more research to determine alternative pro-
ductive use of skilled shipyard labor during times of slack
workload or applying the "firehouse" concept of having
skilled labor available but non-productive during slack
periods
.
3. Standards for measuring the performance of shipyard
activity should be established by a committee comprised of
representatives from the shipbuilding and repair industry,
federal government and educational institutions (e.g. a
group similar to COAS) . Greater credibility would be
accorded the standards (and the possibility of tacit collu-
sion on the part of the industry would be minimized) if tl
were established by a committee representing different back-
grounds and interests. Careful consideration must, be given
by the committee to insure against direct collusion he.i
firms are rewarded for surpassing standards that have been
set low. "Reasonable" standards must be set: The perform-
ance of the shipyards should be compared against these
standards periodically and the resulting information should




4. Increased coordination and interchange of R&D inform-
ation among the Navy, MarAd and the maritime industry should
be conducted through a centralized office established speci-
fically for this purpose. It is possible that the monies
that could potentially be saved by avoiding duplicative P.&D
efforts would be adequate to fund, the coordinating office's
activities
.
5. A thorough study should be conducted to investigate
the migratory habits, and influencing factors, of unemployed
shipyard workers , by skills. The information resulting from
such a study may be of some benefit to both pub 3. ic and
private officials in their managerial capacities. The data
may provide some insight as to the impact certain decisions
(e.g. closing down a particular shipyard or laying off 1,000
employees) may have on the shipyard and the community.
6. The writers do not recommend relaxi; lg the "grand-
father clause" requirement at this time because of the la:
backlog of ships under contract. However, a thorough study
should be conducted to determine what the ii pact would be .'
this particular requirement were eliminated. If it is deter-
mined that the elimination of this requirer woul< 1 lefit
the shipbuilding industry without adversely affecting other
national interests, then the requirement should be terminated.
7. Conduct an investigation to determine the feasibility
of consolidating the inactive Reserve Fleets of both MarAd
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EXAMPLE OF A MAJOR U.S. SHIPYARD ACQUISITION: A CASE
STUDY OF THE NEWPORT NEWS ACQUISITION BY TENNECO, INC.
On April 25, 196 3, both Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry-
dock Co. (NN) and Tenneco, Inc., announced that they were
having "consolidation discussions." A week prior to the
announcement, a Newport News official had stated that,
"friendly interests" had completed purchase of a block of
between 25,000 and 50,000 shares of Newport News common stock
and the stock had risen to its year high of $67.75 per share.
When the buy order was completed, the stock fell to about
$55.00 a share, where it stood en the day of the consolida-
tion announcement. Additionally, a Tenneco spokesman said
that the company had not "recently" purchased a "large" block
of NN stock but did not indicate whether Tenneco owned any
of the NN outstanding shares of common stock; .1,670,595
shares. NN also announced that its billings (work completed
and billed for the quarter ending March 25, 1968, totaled
$74,167,112, an increase over the past years $60,907,013.
Although labor had increased to $22,134 from $20,061 for \
same period the previous year, NN stated thai, the company
was becoming increasingly aware of higher costs of materials
and financing, and was also having difficulty in raising
levels of productivity [21, p. 7], A summary of NN revenues,




On May 23, 19G8, both companies announced that they had
agreed in principal to merge. The merger was subject to the
approval of NN stockholders and called for an exchange by
Tenneco of a $60, seven-percent, 2 5-year sinking fund deben-
ture plus a one-half share of Tenneco common for each share
of Newport News common stock. As of May 22, NN stock was
selling at about $60.38 and Tenneco at about $27.88 per
share. The Tenneco terms of sale represented about $74 for
each share of NN stock. It is also noted that before the
announcement of the agreement to merge, NN had been awarded
a major Navy shipbuilding contract for the nuclear powered
aircraft carrier Nimitz (CVAN 70) [27, p. 11].
On July 25, 1968, NN announced a first half 1968 loss of
$3,460,052 as compared to a net income of $2,791,007 a year
earlier. This loss was a result of recalculating construc-
tion costs of several contracts at a considerably higher
figure than previously anticipated, and the standard prac-
tice of NN was to charge the increases against the quarter
in which they become apparent, according to a NN spokesman.
Sales for the same period had risen to $150 million as com-
pared to $14 million the year before. Additionally, NN
announced a deferral of third quarter dividends [20, p. 16].
On August 20, 1968, NN stockholders approved the sale to
Tenneco in accordance with the previously agreed upon terms.
The sale was to be completed by September 3, 1968. At this
time, NN outstanding shares were about 1.7 million and the
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agreement would amount to a total amount of Tenneco common
shares of 850,000 and $100,2 million in debentures [11, p. 5].
On September 5, 1968, Tenneco announced that it had com-
pleted acquisition of Newport News for about $123 million
in securities. A compilation of Newport News and Tenneco
stock prices as of key dates in the acquisition process are
included in Exhibit 2.
Based on the agreement of sale, the results were as
follows
:
Tenneco Common Stock exchanged: 852,810
Newport News C.S. exchanged: 1,70 5,6 20
Tenneco Debentures value: $102,338,000
Source: Tenneco Annual Report 196 3 [23]
Balance sheet and income data for Newport News are she. n
in Exhibits 3 and 4
.
•*- Evaluation
The following points are considered relevant in
effectively evaluating the possible motivation of Tenneco for
the acquisition and the results:
a. Newport News had a relatively poor year in 19 66.
Net income was the lowest since 1958, as was net income per
common share and dividends per common share.
b. Although 1967 was a "recovery year," announcement
of the loss for the first half of 1968 had an adverse impact
on the shareholder's attitudes toward the management and




NEWPORT NEWS FINANCIAL DATA 1965-1967 (Millions)
1967 1966 1965
Gross Income $305,3 $254.1 $274.8
Net Income (after tax) 6.6 5.5 8,0
Net Income per common stk. 3.95 3.30 4.81
Source: Newport News Annual Report 1967 [18].
EXHIBIT 2
NEWPORT NEWS AND TENNECO STOCK PRICES 19
Date Newport News Tenneco Event.
April 25 $55,875 $26,375 Announced discussions
May 22 60.375 27.875 Agreed to merge
June 17 63.000 29.625 Continuity only
July 25 63.375 29.000 NN announces loss
Aug. 19 69.000 26.750 Sale approved by S.I-I
Sep. 3 69.250 27.000 Merger completed
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NEWPORT NEWS DATA ON INCOME AND EARNINGS FOR YEARS ENDING
DECEMBER 31, 1967 AND 1966 (Millions)
1967 1966
Gross Income $305.28 $254.13
Cost of work 293. 63 243.00
Operating Income $ 11.65 $ 11.13
Less - Provisions for taxes 5 05 5.63
Net Income $ 6.60 $ 5.5
Retained Earnings at beginning of year 6 3 . 59 61 .84
$ 70.19 $ 6 7.34
Dividends paid ($2.30 per sin? re in 1967) 3.84 3_:_L5_
($2.25 per share in 1956)
Retained Earnings balance $ 66.34 $ 63.59
Net Income Per Share of Com >n Sto< ' $ 3.95 $ 3.3
(dollars)
Source: Newport News Annual Report 1967 [18].
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c. Under the Newport News employee common stock
option plan, 70,59 5 shares had been issued by December 31,
1967, at option prices equal to 85% of fair market value.
Option prices ranged from $29.22 to $47.92 per share. Addi-
tionally, as of December 31, 1967, options for the purchase
of 29,525 shares of NN common stock were outstanding.
d. Profit ratios for Newport News in 1966/1967 were
as follows:
Ratio 1966 19 67
Return en Sales (net income/revenues) 2.2% 2.2%
Return on Investment (net inc. /tot . assets) 4.5% 4.7%
Return en Capital (net. income/common stk) 2.5% 3.0%
e. Newport News was virtually debt free with a debt-
to- total assets ratio of .075, deb.t- to-total equity ratio of
,116 and total equity-to-debt of 8.6 in 1967.
f. Retained earnings represented about 74% of total
equity for NN in 196 7.
g. Fixed assets of NN were stated at cost a] d -
most likely undervalued in 19 67.
h. A first look at the security exchange package
offered by Tenneco for the sale of NN indicates that Tenneco
was willing to pay a premium for the acquisition of NN.
This statement is based on the fact that total annual expen-
ditures by Tenneco would amount to the following:
annual interest on debentures $7,16 3,604
dividends on 852,810 shares 1,091,597
(19 6 8 rate)
Total annual cost $8,255,211
1 5 7

Based on the Newport News net income in 1967 of $6.6
million, this cost to Tenneco seems excessive. However, it
must be noted that debenture interest is a tax deductible
expense and dividends are distributions of net income after
taxes. Although the tax rate for Tenneco is not ascertain-
able for 1968 and 1969, assuming a nominal 50% rate, the
after tax expense for the acquisition of NN amount to roughly
$4.67 million.
i. Interestingly enough, after acquisition of NN in
196 8, Tenneco stated in their 19 6 8 annual report that in
accordance with their standard practices, newly required
subsidiaries' contributions under the "pooling" concept were
calculated from the date of acquisition. Thus, in 1968,
Tenneco reported revenues of $97.5 million and income before
taxes and shareholder's interest of $4.5 million for the
Newport News division from September 4 through December 31,
1968.
j. Earnings per share of Tenneco common stock are
a s i n d J cated be 1 ow
:
1966 1L6JL 1968 1969
Tenneco earnings $1.88 $1.95 $2.21 $2.31
per share of C.S.
Source: Tenneco, Inc. Annual Report 196 8 [2 8]
k. Tenneco replaced the president of Newport News
shortly after acquisition in 196 8 and transferred him to the




Based on the data presented, it is the writers'
opinion that Newport News was in a vulnerable position for
being acquired, in that it presented an excellent, low-debt
asset which would increase Tenneco's earnings-per-share
immediately. In addition, Newport News provided the possi-
bility of a tax write-off which could have been carried into
future years income. The relatively low earnings for Newport
News in 1966, the announcement of a loss in the first six
months of 1958 and the deferring of dividends for the third
quarter of 196 3 all had an adverse affect on the stockholders
confidence in the company. The obvious opportunity to profit
by the sale to Tenneco was most influential in the Newport





Caves, Richard, American Indus try: Structure, Conduct
,
Performance . Fnglewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
Inc. , 19 72.
2. Center for Maritime Studies. Improving the Prospe cts
for United States Shipbuil ding. Glen Grove, N.Y.:
Webb Institute of Naval Architecture, 1969.
3. Chief of Naval Operations, CNO Message 072349Z/030
Mar 75 ZEO, "Weekly Newsgram from CHINFO (Navy
Internal Relations Activity)," March 1975.
4. Cohen, Jerome B., "The Economic Aspects of Conglomerates,"
In Conglomer ate Mergers and Acquisitions: Qpin.i.
and Analysis , Saint John's Law Review, vol. 44, N< .,
York: Saint John's Law Review Association, Spring
1970, pp. 49-60.
5. Dean, Joel, "Causes and Consequences of Growth by Conglom-
erate Merger: An Introduction," In Cong lomerate
Mergers and Acquisitions : Opinion and Analysis, Saint
John's Lav/ Review, vol. 44, New York: Saint John 1 :;
Law Review Association, Spring 1970, pp. 15-36.
6. DOD Directive 50 00.1, Subject: Acquisition o c Major
Defense Systems , dated 13 July 19 71.
7. Frankel, E. G. , and Marcus, H. S., Ocean Trar n,
Report No. 72-18, Cambridge: MIT, 1973.
8. Gorter, Wytze, United State s Shipping Pali c
,
. . fork:
Harper & Brothers, 19 56.
9. Hayward, John T., "Shipbuilding: Problems Beset the
Navy's Program," Government Executive , June 1974,
pp. 81-83.
10. Hessman, James D., "The Shipyard Gap - and How it Grew,"
Seapower , August 1974, pp. 2 8-33.
11. "Holders of Newport News Shipbuilding Vote Firm's Sale to
Tenneco," Wall Street Journal , Aug. 20, 196 8, p. 5.
12. Hunt, Pearson, Williams, Charles M. , and Donaldson, Gordon,
Basi c Bus iness Finance , Homewood, 111.: Richard D.
Irwin, Inc., 1971.




14. Kuhlman, John M. , and Duke, Richard M. , "A Concept of
the Conglomerate Firm," In Conglomerate Merger? and
Acqui siti ons: Opinion and Analysis / Saint John's
Law Review, vol. 44, New York: Saint John's L
Review Association, Spring 19 70, pp. 61-65.
15. Lynch, Harry H., Financial Performance of Conglomerates
,
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971.
16. Maritime Transportation Research Board, Shiphu.i3.ding
Research and Development , Washington, D.C.: National
Academy of Sciences, /April 1973.
1 7 . Markh am , Jesse Wi 1 1 i am , Conglome r a ':e
i
Enterpri se and. Pub --
lie Policy
,
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University
Press, 1973.
18. Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Co., Inc., Annual
Report 196 7.
39. Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, Shipyard
Bulletin , January 19 75.
20. "Newport News Ship Defers Action on Payout/' Wall Street
Journal
, July 25, 196 8, p. 16.
21. "Newport News, Tenneco Discuss a Consolidation," Wall
Street Journal , April 25, 196 8, p. 7.
22. Prina, L. Edgar, "The Last Rainbow; U.S. Shipbuilding
Battle Heats Up," Seapower, Sep. 19 74, pp. 36-39.
23. Shipbuilders Council of America, Annua 3 R ort: 73
,
Washington, D.C.: ' Shipbuilders ; ncil of :a,
1974.
24. Shipbuilders Council of America, Shipyard Weekly , No. 5,
J anu ary 3 , 19 7 5 .
25. Shipbuilders Council of America, Statistical Quarterly
,
Third Quarter, 1974.
26. Smith, Richard B. , "Conglomerates and Take-overs," In
Conglomerate Mergers and Acqui s! tions : Oplni on an
d
Analysis, Saint John's Law Review, vol. 44, New York:
Saint John's Law Review Association, Spring 19 70,
pp. 905-914.
27. "Tenneco Agrees to Buy Biggest U.S. Shipbuilder," Wall
Street Journal , May 2 3, .1968, p . 1 1
.
28. Tenneco, Inc. , Annua] Report 1968.
16.1

29. "Tenncco, Inc. Completes Acquisition of Newport News,"
Wall Street Journal
, Sep. 5 , 19 6 8, p . 9
.
30. "The Supertanker Steel Squeeze, 11 Bu s i ne s s Woek , May 18,
1974, pp. 28-29.
31. U.S. Commission on American Shipbuilding, Report of the
Commission on American Shipbuilding , Vol. II,
Washington, D.C.: October 1973.
32. U.S. Commission on American Shipbuilding, Report of t
h
e-
Commission on American Shipbuilding , Vol . Ill,
Washington, D.C.: October 1973.
33. U.S. Congress. House, Committee on Appropriations, Sub-
committee on Department of Defense, Testimony of
Vice Admiral Hyman G. Rickover , Hearings, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. , Washington, D.C: GPO , 1972.
34. U.S. Congress. House, Committee on Appropriations,
Subcommittee on Department of Defense, Testimony o f
Vice Admiral Hyman G . Rickover , Hearings 9 3d Cong.
,
1st Sess., Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1973.
35. U.S. Congress. House, Committee on Armed Services, Sea-
power Subcommittee, Military Postur< , Hearings, 9 3d
Cong., 2d Sess., Washington, D.C. : GPO, 1974.
36. U.S. Congress. House, Committee on Armed Services, Sea-
powe r Sub cornmi 1 1ee , Status of S ; trds , He ari ngs ,
9.1st Cong., 2d Sess., Washington, D.C: GPO, J;': 70.
37. U.S. Congress. House,- Committee on Armed Services,





92d Cong., 1st Sess., Washington, D.C: GPO ] 71.
3G. U.S. Congress. House, Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, Mar it:' me Brief incrs , Hearings, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess., Washington, D.C: 0, 19 73,
39. U.S. Congress. House, Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, Subcommittee on Merchant Marine, Maritime
Authorization - FY1974 , Hearings, 9 3d Cong., 1st
Sess., Washington, D.C: GPO, 1973.
40. U.S. Congress. House, Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, Subcommittee on Merchant Marine, Merchant
Marine Miscellaneous, Part 1, Hearings, 9 3d Cong.,
1st Ses s . , Washington , D.C: GPO , 19 7 3.
41. U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee
on Priorities and Economy in Government, The Acquis i-
tion of Weapon Systems , Part 2, Hearings, Washington,
D.C: GPO, 19 70.
162

42. U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Coirimittee, Subcommittee
on Priorities and Economy in Government, The Acquisi-
tion of We apon Systems , Part 6, Hearings, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess., Washington, D.C.: GPO , 1973.
43. U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee
on Priorities and Economy in Government, The Acquisi-
tion of Weapon Sys tems , Part 7, Hearings, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess., Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1974.
44. U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on Commerce, Subcommittee
on Merchant Marine, Maritime Programs Fiscal Year 19 74,
Hearings, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., Washington, D.C.: GPO,
1973.
45. U.S. Congress. Senate, Senate Reports
,
Miscellaneous
Reports on Public Bills, IV, Vol. 1-4, Report No.
91-10 80, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., Washington, D.C.: GPO,
19 70 .
46. U.S. Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration,
Commerce News, Maritime Administration , MA MR 7 5-4,
Washington, D.C.: Maritime Administration, February
7, 1975.
47. U.S. Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration,
MarAd 19 70 , Washington, D.C.: GPO, 19 71c
48. U.S. Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration,
MarAd 1971 , Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1971.
49. U.S. Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration,
MarAd 19 72 , Washington, D.C. : GPO, 1372.
50. U.S. Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration
i' : Ad 19 73 , Washington, D.C: GPO, April 1974.
51. U.S. Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration,
Relative Cost of Shipbuilding , Washington, D.C:
GPO, June 1974.
52. U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Navy,
Military Sealift Command, Sealif t , Washington, D.C:
January 19 75.
53. U.S. Department of Defense, Naval Ship Systems Command,
"Shipbuilding Claims and their Evaluation by the
Navy," by James, D. W. , Jr., and Ruttenberg, N. II.,
Washington, D.C: 7 January 1974,
54. U.S. Department of Defense, Naval Ship Systems Command,





55. U.S. Secretary of Commerce, Annual Report, FY1 9 74,
Washington, D.C.: GPO , 1975.
56. "Wall Street Journal Heard on the Street," Wall Street
Journal , Sep. 23, 19 74, p. 29.
57. "Whatever Happened to America's Vast 'Mothball 1 Fleet,' 1





1. Defense Documentation Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
2. Library, Code 0212 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
3. Associate Professor C. R. Jones, Code 55Js 22
Department of Operations Research
and Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 9 39 40
4. Associate Professor M. G. Sovereign, Code 55Zo 1




5. Adjunct Professor R. R. Judson, Code 55Ju 1
Department of Operations Research and
Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 939 40
6. LCDR John W. Ward, USN 1
122 Moreel Circle
Monterey, California 93940
7. LT Larkin E. Garcia, USN 1
9112 Cordova, N.E.













12 Se^'75 INTERLIBRARY LOAN
^XFMC, San/Jose
3 Dec 75 (7>LL-Def erase Logistics
Studies Information Exchange)












3 2768 001 92956 5
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
O
